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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is to discover the 
axiological basis, or value orientation, upon which Karl 
Mannhetm has developed a social philosophy. A crucial is-
sue in such an investigation is the question of the link 
between Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and his axiolog-
ical assumptions. This question of the link between soci-
ology and value theory raises a number of questions with 
respect to the work of Mannheim. Are there axiological 
implications in the sociology of knowledge? What are the 
basic epistemological claims which Mannheim makes on behalf 
of the sociology of knowledge? What is the relation be-
tween these epistemological claims and the problems of 
value theory? Do "facts" and "values," in other words, 
have a common ontological source, or do they arise from 
completely different sources? Does Mannheim draw the axi-
ological conclusions which are implied by his sociology of 
knowledge? What are the axiological presuppositions of his 
social philosophy? In short, is value theory possible and, 
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if so, under what conditions? 
These questions suggest, in a rudimentary way, the 
procedural outline through which it will be possible to ex-
plore the thought of a man who has encompassed within his 
work the concerns and problems not only of the sociologist, 
but also of the social philosopher and the philosopher of 
knowledge. 
There is here, as is the case with most problems, a 
problem-behind-the-problem, the awareness of which may 
serve to point up more clearly the significance of some of 
the issues involved. The problem-behind-the-problem in 
this case is posed in an article by Alfred Stern. 1 After 
discussing at some length the value systems of Nicolai 
Harbnann and Friedrich Nietzsche, Stern observes that 
Nietzsche's extreme axiological relativism and subjectivism 
insist that everything depends upon the individual, whereas 
in Harbnann's extreme axiological absolutism almost nothing 
any longer depends upon the individual. Consequently, it 
becomes clear that an absolutistic theory of values may be 
as dangerous as a relativistic one. Values which are pre-
sented as transcendent, as absolute and independent of the 
individual, are also independent of the individual's 
1Alfred Stern, "The Current Crisis in the Realm of 
Values," The Personalist, 31(1950), 245-253. 
protest. Values which are seen as relative only lack any 
unitary principle, and the result is a chaos of values. 
Stern concludes: 
If we saw before that integral axiological absolutism 
leads to totalitarianism, we see now that integral 
axiological relativism leads to anarchy. This is, in 
my opinion, the critical issue in contemporary phil-
osophy of values. It is also the critical issue of 
our whole civilization.! 
3 
The question must here be faced as to whether there 
is a constructive alternative to the above alternatives. 
The dominant mood today would seem to favor very strongly 
the tendency toward axiological relativism. This may be 
seen to a large extent in the utilitarian and instrumental-
ist emphases as well as in the ethical skepticism which is 
implicit in some existentialist positions. The mood of 
axiological relativism is due in large measure to the de-
velopment of ideological analysis, psychoanalysis, sociol-
ogy of knowledge, and the extreme functionalist orientation 
which has characterized much of contemporary anthropology 
and sociology, from whose ranks have emerged what Robert K. 
Merton calls "the professional debunkers." All of this 
historical and intellectual development has undercut the 
stabilizing bases of civilization, including the axiological 
bases, and has led to an emphasis upon relativism in the 
1 ~·, p. 253. 
4 
area of value. 1 
However, there is another side to this, another 
sociological and anthropological approach which has played 
and can continue to play a constructive role, or at any 
rate not a nihilistic role, in the area of epistemology and 
axiology. Such men as David Bidney in anthropology, Karl 
Mannbeim in sociology, and Gordon Allport in psychology, 
have made attempts to deal with some of the philosophical 
implications of their respective disciplines, and to deal 
systematically with the problem of the presuppositions of 
their own disciplines. 
This dissertation is expressly interested in the 
figure of Karl Mannbetm because he bas done an extensive 
job of attempting to relate his own field of specializa-
tion, ''Wissenssoziologie" (the sociology of knowledge), to 
other disciplines, especially philosophy and the philosophy 
of knowledge. Mannbetm' s main thrust in this area bas been 
to point up especially what he considered to be the epis-
temological implications of Wissenssoziologie. In short, 
Mannbeim claims, the facts which the sociology of knowl-
edge turm up require new epistemological foundations. This 
leads logically to the problem of the dissertation as 
1Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social 
Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: the Free-press, 1949), 
p. 219. 
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formulated in the opening paragraph. Implicit in the claims 
of Mannheim's supporters is the claim that he has proposed 
a line of thought, a sociological approach, which is a way 
through the axiological dilemma posed by Alfred Stern. The 
problem of this dissertation is to dis~over whether this is 
so. 
The intent of this study is to examine the role of 
value in Mannhetm' s whole system. Such an inquiry inescap-
ably involves epistemological issues as well as the presup-
positions of sociological theory. However, beyond this 
presuppositional level, this study will not attempt to deal 
with the wide range of detailed questions of sociological 
theory, nor with secondary epistemological problems. Both 
the epistemological issues and the questions of theoretical 
sociology have received extended attention by many of 
Mannheim's critics. Mannheim's sociological theory and his 
epistemological conclusions are the given, the starting 
point of this inquiry into the problem of value, and its 
role in Mannhetm' s system of thought. 
Even in the field of value theory, this study 
claims to be examining but a small portion of the many com-
plex and important issues that pervade this field. It does 
anticipate, however, that some of these issues may be seen 
more clearly through an intensive study of a figure such as 
Karl Mannheim and the problem which his thought poses. It 
is in this sense a sort of "microscopic" rather than a 
"macroscopic" approach. 
6 
The study will thus involve an intensive analysis 
of Mannhetm's own writings, subject to the limitations 
declared below. Secondary sources will also be used, pri-
marily for clarification of the problem, and for clarify-
ing the present status of certain issues that have evolved 
in the historical development of Wissenssoeiologie. 
2. Previous Research in the Field 
Almost all of the previous research on Karl 
Mannhetm's Wissenssoziologie has been undertaken from the 
perspectives of either sociological or epistemological con-
cerns. The main attention given to Mannheim has been that 
of his fellow sociologists, raising theoretical problems 
concerning Mannheim's historicism, or the scientific rele-
vance of imputation, or other kindred issues. 1 
Considerable attention has also been given to the 
epistemological problems raised by Mannheim. Jacques J. 
Maquet has examined the epistemological significance of 
Mannheim, and has described a series of "metaphysical 
1cf. Merton, oa. cit., for a summary of the socio-
logical issues involve in Wissenssoziologie, Cbs. 12 and 
13. 
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presuppositions" which he claims give coherence to 
Mannheim's whole system. These metaphysical presupposi-
tions include: a dialectical conception of reality; di-
alectical historicism; the world comprehended as a complex 
of processes constantly in flux; man's rationality emerg-
ing from an interaction between man as organism and the 
exterior world. 1 
Others such as Arthur Child, Virgil G. Hinshaw, and 
E. Williams, have criticized Mannheim' s epistemological 
conclusions. 2 
Werner Stark, in an introductory text on the sub-
ject of Wissenssoziologie, deals with the problem mainly 
as a historian of ideas. Stark's concern with the analysis 
of presuppositions is again primarily in terms of the 
historical relativity of truth. 3 His preoccupation is 
mainly with "facts" and "ideas," not with "values." 
1Jacques J. Maquet, The Sociology of Knowled,e, 
trans. John F. Locke (Boston: The Beacon Press, 195 ), 
p. 87f. 
2Arthur Child, "The Problem of Truth in the Soci-
ology of Knowledge," Ethics, 58(1947), 18-34. 
Virgil G. Hinshaw, "The Epistemological Relevance 
of Mannheim' s Sociology of Knowledge," Journal of Phil-
osophx, 40(1943), 57-72. 
E. Williams, "Sociologists and Knowledge," 
Philosophy of Science, 14(1947), 224-30. 
3werner Stark, The Sociolog~ of Knowledfe (Glencoe, 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1958).ee especial y Char.ter 
4 on the "Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge. ' 
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Values are treated only incidentally, in terms of their 
ideological character. This is, in fact, true of prac-
tically all of the work in the field, namely, that values 
are considered only as incidental to a particular ideology 
or socio-cultural pattern. 
Almost the only attention Mannheim's work has re-
ceived from philosophers has been negatively-critical, in 
the form of response to his proposals for epistemological 
reconstruction. No one to date has approached his work in 
terms of the problems of value theory, and an analysis of 
his axiological presuppositions. Hence, the reason for 
the present study. 
3. Limitations of this Study 
The sources of information for this study include 
those writings of Mannheim which are available in this 
country, both in German and in English. Through the ef-
forts of some of Mannhetm' s former students and colleagues, 
three collections of essays have been published, thus mak-
ing available in English virtually all of Mannheim's 
theoretical studies in sociology, social psychology, and 
the sociology of knowledge. After 1933, the year of his 
emigration to England, his works were published in English. 
Only a few of Mannheim's published articles and manuscripts 
are not available in this country and are not included in 
this study. 
9 
Articles not available for this study include the 
following: "Beitrige zur Theorie der Weltanschauungs-
interpretation" (1922) , "Die Bedeutung der Konkurrenz im 
Gebiete des Geistigen" (1929), "Zur Problematik der 
Soziologie in Deutschland" (1929), "The Place of Sociology 
in the Social Sciences" (1936), "Adult Education and the 
Social Sciences" (1938), "Mass Education and Group Analy-
sis" (1939), "The Function of the Refugee" (1940), 
"Democratic Planning and the New Science of Society" (1944), 
"The Meaning of Popularization in a Mass Society" (1945). 
The primary sources utilized in this study include 
the three collections of Mannheim's essays, Essays on the 
Sociology of Knowledge, Ess~ys on the Sociology of Culture, 
Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, and the follow-
ing works of Mannheim: Systematic Sociology, Ideology and 
Utopia, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, Diag-
nosis of OUr Time, and Freedom, Power, and Democratic Plan-
ning. Additional articles consulted, both in German and in 
English, are listed in the Bibliography. 
10 
4. The Method of the Dissertation 
The method of the dissertation will be as follows: 
i. Exposition 
Chapters II and III will be primarily expository, 
setting forth the main outlines of Mannheim's approach to 
the sociology of knowledge and the epistemological conclu-
sions he has drawn. An attempt will be made to discover 
from Mannheim' s own writings the answers to the questions 
formulated in the foregoing problem of the dissertation. 
ii. Analysis 
Chapter IV will be primarily analytic. The prob-
lem of determining the value components of Mannheim's 
sociological system is basically a complex problem in con-
tent analysis. This content analysis will be undertaken 
through a series of categorial analyses. The categories 
of analysis have been derived in part from a comparative 
study of contemporary value theory, and in part from 
Mannheim' s own writings. Contemporary literature in the 
field of value theory reveals certain perennially recurring 
problems and pervasive issues. These same issues are re-
flected in the language and structure of Mannheim's soci-
ology and social philosophy. It is a constellation of such 
issues that is suggested as the basis of this analysis. 
11 
The categories here proposed reflect certain of these basic 
issues in contemporary value theory. It is supposed that 
the kinds of answers supplied to these categorial problems 
by Mannheim's writings will yield the value components 
that are implicit and explicit in those writings. There 
is no inherent hierarchical priority so far as these cate-
gories are concerned. It is readily evident also that 
there are certain immanent relations between various cate-
gories that make for apparent "overlapping," and obvious 
difficulty in finding absolutely discrete and exclusive 
categories. Nevertheless, in the process of analysis, an 
attempt will be made to set forth (in the context of 
Mannheim's own discussion) the distinguishing emphases of 
each category, and their relation to the basic problem of 
the dissertation. 
These categories of analysis are: 
1. Value--Intrinsic and Instrumental 
2. Value--Inclusive and Exclusive 
3. Value--Permanence and Change 
4. Value--Causality and Spontaneity 
5. Value--Egoism and Communitarianism 
6. Value and Personality 
7. Value and the Ought 
8. Value and the Meaning of Freedom 
9. Value and Religion 
12 
iii. Comparison and Synthesis 
Chapter V will involve mainly critical comparison 
and synthesis. The results of the categorial analysis 
will be subjected to critical and comparative study, for 
the purpose of inquiring into the consistency and coherence 
of his value presuppositions and his sociological conclu-
sions, and to offer a synthesis, or "profile," of his basic 
axiological presuppositions, educed from the foregoing 
analysis. 
On the basis of such analysis and comparative study, 
the answers to the questions put forth in the opening para-
graph of the dissertation will be sought. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANNHEIM'S THINKING 
1. Brief Account of Mannheim' s Life 
Karl Mannheim was born in Hungary in 1893, into a 
Jewish middle-class family. During his university life in 
Budapest, he moved largely among the socialist intellectual 
circles which assumed a leading role in the post-World War 
I revolution. Hegelian and Marxist thought had profoundly 
shaped his way of thinking during this period of his study. 
Georg Lukacs was the source of two major influences: 
(1) demonstrating the general value of sociological method 
in all fields of social-intellectual history, and (2) show-
ing that Marx was the only one who truly grasped Hegel's 
idea of self-alienation, and pointing out that Marx had 
transferred the redeeming function of philosophy into the 
processes of the social revolution. 1 
When subsequent political reaction in Hungary frus-
trated his desire for free intellectual development, he 
1Albert Salomon, "Karl Mannheim 1893-1947," Social 
Research, 14(1947), 350. 
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migrated to Germany. In 1920 he went to Heidelberg, and 
there he continued to revise his Marxist theories in the 
direction of relativistic historicism, primarily under the 
influence of Emil Lederer, Max Weber, and Wilhelm Dilthey. 
His doctoral dissertation on The Structural Analysis of 
Knowledge, published in 1922, was an outgrowth of philo-
sophical issues raised by Heinrich Rickert and Edmund 
Husser! in the field of epistemology. 1 
Lederer transformed the Marxist theme of forces of 
production into the formula of Be! whole of the social 
context. From Weber, Mannheim learned a greater refine-
ment of technique and methodological principles. Mannheim 
took up Dilthey's differentiation between explanation 
(Erklirung) and comprehension (Verstehen), affirming with 
Weber that sociology is a discipline of interior comprehen-
.!!2!:!· 2 
In 1929, Mannheim left Heidelberg to take up a pro-
fessorship at the University of Frankfurt where he remained 
until 1933. Upon Hitler's accession to power and with it 
the end of intellectual freedom in Germany, Mannheim ac-
cepted a lectureship at the London School of Economics. In 
1945 he was appointed to the chair of sociology of education 
1Louis Wirth, "Obituary," American Sociological 
Review, 12(1947), 356. 
~quet, op. cit., p. 40. 
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in the University of London. He died in London on January 
9, 1947. 
2. Mannheim's General Sociological 
Orientation 
Mannheim followed, with significant modifications 
at many points, a sociological line of thought evolving 
through Marx, Lukacs, Lederer, Dilthey, Troeltscb, and 
Weber. This approach constituted essentially a far-reaching 
historicism which views thought categories as a function of 
the social, class, and group structure. It included also a 
dynamic conception of knowledge, and a concentration on the 
development of a concrete sociology rather than a sort of 
vague and speculative imputation of abstract qualities to 
the abstract individual. From Dilthey and Weber in particu-
lar be derived an emphasis upon affective-volitional ele-
ments within the thought processes. From phenomenologists 
such as Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Scheler, Mannheim 
was challenged to a constant emphasis upon a strict and ac-
curate observation of the elements of human experience. 1 
Eclectic in many respects, he nonetheless fought a 
constant battle against the neo-Hegelians and morphologists 
~erton, op. cit., p. 490. 
of his day, as well as against the contemporary extreme 
empiricists and individualists, such as Bertrand Russell 
1 and F. A. Hayek. 
16 
His eclecticism was not of a casual or mechanical 
sort, but rather a diligent search for the most compre-
hensive and systematic synthesis of the numerous sciences 
of man. Basically, his sociological method is an attempt 
to apply psychological analysis in the interpretation of 
social and historical situations. His systematic sociol-
ogy avoids the either/or of generalizing vs. individualiz-
ing methods. He utilizes both methods, allotting to each 
specific tasks in the various spheres of sociology. His 
efforts are all directed toward the development of a 
socialized-psychology or a psychologically-oriented soci-
ology. Mannheim was always impatient with American soci-
ology for being what he termed an "isolating empiricism," 
always meticulous, always exact but, in the end, of doubt-
ful significance or help in understanding or solving man's 
crucial and crushing social problems. "b2!1 is the total-
ity of society, the dynamic forces, the process of inte-
gration."2 He was convinced that isolated empirical 
1Karl Mannheim, Systematic Sociolo~, edited by 
J. s. Eros and w. A. c. Stewart (LOndon:utledge, 1957), 
p. xxiv. 
2Karl Mannheim, "German Sociology (1918-1933)," 
Politica, February (1934), p. 30. 
17 
"facts," apart from any understanding of their inner mean-
ing, their inner relatedness to human life and the meaning 
of the social process, were useless. 
To his own sociological framework and method, he 
added the tools of analytic psychology. His emphasis upon 
structure and relationism led him also toward gestalt 
rather than connectionist or associationist theories. 1 In 
short, Mannheim sought a genuine synthesis between the 
methods of modern dynamic psychology and those of sociol-
ogy: the generalizing, the individualizing, the historical, 
the economic-dialectical, the formal, and the socio-
cultural. 
In this largest sense of the word all the cultural 
sciences belong to the field of the social sciences; 
for instance, philology, the history of literature, the 
history of art, the history of knowledge, economics, 
economic history, political science and anthropology. 
But this huge amount of material must be formed into 
some coherence by a central discipline which has both 
a point of view and a subject matter of its own. In 
the field of social sciences the central discipline 
is sociology. It is on the one hand a synthetic dis-
cipline, tryi~ to unify from a central point of view 
the results of the separate disciplines; and it is on 
the other hand an analytic and specialized discipline 
with its own field of research. The specialized sub-ject matter of sociology is the forms of living ~o­
gether of man, the sum of which we call society. 
~eim, Systematic Sociology, p. xiv. 
2 Ibid., p. 1. 
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Having set forth this rather large responsibility 
as the task of sociology, Mannheim points out that these 
"forms of living together" can be described and explained 
along two divergent lines. Hence we have two main sections 
of sociology: (1) systematic and general sociology; (2) com-
parative sociology. Systematic and general sociology is so-
called because it deals with general forms and tendencies 
as they may be found in every society. Comparative sociol-
ogy deals primarily with the historical variations of the 
same phenomenon, such institutions as marriage, family, law, 
education, and government. 1 
3. Mannheim' s Approach to the 
Sociology of Knowledge 
Mannheim was as much aware as anyone that his dis-
cipline was in its earliest infancy, theoretically primi-
tive, and yet he had great hopes for what it might accom-
plish. At one point, for example, he described as the pri-
mary objective of sociology "the rational mastery of the 
universe of hwnan relations."2 He saw in it the possibility 
1 ~., p. 2. 
2Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociolo'y of Culture, 
edited and translated by Ernest Miririheim andaul Kecskemeti 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 19. 
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of overcoming the "vague, ill-considered, and sterile form 
of relativism with regard to scientific knowledge which is 
increasingly prevalent today."1 Elsewhere he declared: 
"Our task, therefore, is not to engage in prophecies, but 
to find a clue to the systematic study of the fundamental 
social factors in their bearing on culture."2 
According to Mannheim, the task of the sociology of 
knowledge is to be defined by two major aspects. It is on 
the one hand a theory, and as such seeks "to analyze the 
relationship between knowledge and existence." On the 
other hand it is "historical-sociological research," a 
method for tracing the various forms which this relationship 
has taken in the development of human thought. 3 Both of 
these discussions provide the background to Mannheim's 
claims for the epistemological consequences of the soci-
ology of knowledge. 
1Karl Mannheim, Ideologt and Utopia, translated by 
Louis Worth and Edward Shils 14ew York£ Harcourt, Brace 
and Co., 1940), p. 264. 
2Karl Mannheim, "The Crisis of Culture in the Era of 
Mass-Democracies and Autarchies," The Sociological Review, 
26(April, 1934), 106. 
~eim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 264. 
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i. Wissensoziologie as Theory Concerning the Relationship 
Between Knowledge and Existence 
(1) Distinguished from Theo;y of Ideology 
Mannheim distinguishes his approach from the theory 
of ideology and its proponents, whose task is seen as the 
unmasking of more or less conscious deceptions and distor-
tions of human groups and their patterns of thinking. A 
propos is the query of Hans Speier who asks what has become 
of truth in this age when it is easier to unmask the ideol-
ogist than to state a type of thinking which does not re-
sult from some subtle influence. He critically observes: 
"On being asked what our values are, we are tempted to tell 
how we got them! Aren't we likely under these conditions to 
lose the ability to proceed from the extrinsic conditions of 
ideas to their intrinsic meaning and philosophical signifi-
cance?"1 Mannheim is concerned not so much with distortions 
and deceptions as he is concerned with the varying ways in 
which objects actually present themselves to various sub-
jects according to the differences in social settings. His 
main preoccupation is with the problem of how mental struc-
tures, thoughts, ideas, etc., are inevitably differently 
formed in varying social and historical contexts. He thus 
laans Speier, Review of Ideolofy and Utol(ia, by 
Karl Mannheim, American Journal of Soc ology, 43 July, 
1937)' 155. 
21 
makes his alliance at the outset, not with the "profes-
sional debunkers" of Merton, 1 whose main preoccupation is 
with unmasking illusion, deceit, delusion, and falsehoods, 
but rather with a positive and sympathetic and appreciative 
understanding of the nature of human perception and the 
ultimate human quest for truth. 
He not only restates and redefines the problem and 
the meaning of ideology, but utilizes for the most part a 
new term, "perspective," for the avowed purpose of reliev-
ing his terminology of any moral or denunciatory intent. 2 
By speaking of the perspective of a thinker, Mannheim re-
fers to the subject's whole pattern of conceiving things. 
(2) The Meaning of "Determination" 
In speaking of the existential determination of 
knowledge, Mannheim insists upon leaving open-ended the 
meaning of "determination." He does not mean a mechanical 
cause-effect sequence. '~e leave the meaning of 'determina-
tion' open," Mannheim states, "and only empirical investiga-
tion will show us how strict is the correlation between 
life-situation and thought-process, or what scope exists 
1 Merton, op. cit., p. 220. 
2Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 266. 
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for variations in the correlation."1 The German phrase 
"Seinsverbundenes Wissen," he cautions, has a meaning which 
leaves open the exact nature of the determinism. 
Such a determination is to be regarded as a demon-
strated fact in those realms of thought in which it can be 
shown (a) that the process of knowing is influenced by 
extra-theoretical factors, i.e., by existential factors 
rather than by an autonomous "inner dialectic," and (b) if 
these factors can be shown to penetrate into the concrete 
content of knowledge. 2 
With the growing evidence of weaknesses connected 
with the ~ priori assumption of an "immanent intellectual 
history," independent of the social process, it becomes 
increasingly evident to Mannheim that 
(a) every formulation of a problem is made possible 
only by a previous actual human experience which in-
volves such a problem; (b) in selection from the 
multiplicity of data there is involved an act of will 
on the part of the knower; and (c) forces arising out 
of living experience are significant in the direction 
which the treatment of the problem follows.3 
(3) Relationism 
In short, the results of Mannheim's studies in the 
sociology of knowledge lead him decisively to the conclusion 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 267. 
3Ibid., p. 268. 
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that the position 21 the observer influences the results of 
thought. This fact leads to one of Mannheim's basic doc-
trines, that of "relationism." Relationism refers to the 
fact that thought manifests itself as an instrument of ac-
tion; as such, it is socially conditioned and its validity 
is linked to this social perspective. "Relationism," he 
writes, "does not signify that there are no criteria of 
rightness and wrongness in a discussion. It does insist, 
however, that it lies in the nature of certain assertions 
that they cannot be formulated absolutely, but only in 
terms of the perspective of a given situation."1 
(4) Particularization 
The doctrine of relationism leads to another doc-
trine, that of "particularization." Having described the 
relational process, the relational aspect of knowing as 
conceived by the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim then 
faces the inevitable question: '~at can it tell us about 
the validity of an assertion that we would not know if we 
had not been able to relate it to the standpoint of the 
assertor?" In other words, have we said anything about the 
truth or falsity of a particular assertion when it has been 
demonstrably imputed to liberalism or to Marxism or to some 
1 ~·' p. 283. 
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other perspective? This question brings the discussion to 
what is perhaps the most critical issue of all, insofar as 
the epistemological implications of Wissenssoziologie are 
concerned. Three answers have been made to this question 
by various students of the sociology of knowledge. 1 
(a) The first answer, and one which is utilized 
predominantly by extreme functionalists and ideological 
analysts, proposes that the absolute validity of an asser-
tion is denied when its structural relationship to a given 
social situation bas been demonstrated. Those who accept 
this position assume that the demonstration of this sort 
of relationship is ipso facto refutation of the opponent's 
assertion. Those who accept this position generally util-
ize this method as a device for annihilating the validity 
of all assertions--except perhaps their own. 
(b) The second answer is in complete opposition to 
the first. This view asserts that the imputations that the 
sociology of knowledge establishes between a statement and 
its assertor tells us nothing concerning the truth-value of 
the assertion, since the particular manner in which a state-
ment originates does not affect its validity. 2 That is to 
say, whether an assertion is liberal or conservative, 
1 ~·, p. 283f. 
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fanatical or neutral, in and of itself gives no indication 
of its correctness. This view, in fact, denies any ultimate 
relevance for the findings of the sociology of knowledge, 
so far as the problem of validity is concerned, and to this 
extent sees no implications for epistemological pursuits. 
Such an attitude as this is expressed by J. W. N. Watkins 
in his assertion that "the sociologist of knowledge reveals 
that a skeptical epistemology is the product of rootless, 
urban intellectuals like Socrates and Descartes, whose 
faith bas been shaken. • • • (These social explanations are 
sheer bluff)."1 
(c) In contrast to the two foregoing views, Mannheim 
suggests a third alternative, a third possible way of judg-
ing the validity of an assertion. 2 This view sees all as-
sertions as being made from a given perspective, inasmuch 
as there is always "a close bond which connects the social 
process itself with intellectual development and the forma-
tion of the mind."3 The perspective of an observer, 
1 J. W. N. Watkins, "Massification," Review of 
Essays on the SociologJ of Culture, by Karl Mannheim, 
Spectator, 197(August ~, 1956), 258. 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 284. 
3Karl Mannbeim, "Utopia," Encyclondia of the so-
cial Sciences, ed. Edwin R. A. Sel1gman,(1935), 2o1. 
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therefore, must always be considered but a partial and 
limited perspective. It should be noted that an important 
consequence of Mannheim's position is that an idea cannot 
be refuted solely by laying bare its genesis. Once the 
interests have been uncovered through the efforts of the 
sociology of knowledge, it still remains to refute it di-
rectly, or to affirm its probable or limited validity. The 
positive contribution of the sociology of knowledge, in 
this connection, is that every complete and thorough soci-
ological analysis of knowledge delimits, in content as 
well as structure, the view to be analyzed, enabling one to 
observe the limitations and specific context of any given 
perspective. 1 
The problem of validity, in contrast to the two 
opposing views, lies in an intermediary position, the cri-
teria for which will be discussed in a subsequent section. 
The point to be made here is simply that Mannheim makes no 
claim whatsoever that sociology of knowledge will supplant 
epistemological inquiry, but rather that it has made cer-
tain discoveries which have "more than a mere factual 
relevance," and which have, in fact, "specific implications 
for the epistemological enterprise, seen from whatever 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 284. 
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angle."1 He declares that "the function of the findings of 
the sociology of knowledge lies somewhere in a fashion 
hitherto not clearly understood, between irrelevance to the 
establishment of truth on the one hand, and entire adequacy 
for determining truth on the other."2 
ii. Wissenssoziologie as Historical-Sociological Research 
(1) Historical Reconstruction 
A second aspect of the task of sociology of knowl-
edge is concerned with the problems of methodology and the 
development of techniques for historical-sociological re-
search. Mannheim considers this to be the most urgent and 
immediate task, to demonstrate its ability to engage in 
actual empirical research and to work out various criteria 
for assuring exactness and control over the empirical 
truths issuing from this historical-sociological research. 
He believes that there is much to be learned methodologic-
ally from the philological disciplines and from the methods 
used in the history of art, particularly with reference to 
stylistic correlations of various periods. 3 In these two 
areas of study the methods of "dating" and "placing" the 
various artistic, linguistic, literary, and cultural 
1 Ibid., p. 287. 2 Ibid., p. 307. 
3Ibid. 
-
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phenomena are especially advanced and have much to offer to 
the sociology of knowledge. 
(2) Typological Analysis 
The basic task of research in the sociology of 
knowledge is to find a means of determining the various 
perspectives or viewpoints which gradually emerge in the 
history of thought, and to observe the process of change 
and transmission in the social process. This involves the 
reconstruction of integral modes of thought and perspectives, 
and the discovery of the underlying unity of outlook for the 
respective modes. Following this initial step, the recon-
structed "ideal types" or modes or perspectives arrived at 
through the above procedure then become indispensable 
hypotheses for research, through the comparison of individ-
ual concrete cases with these ideal types. 1 
(3) Problem of Imputation 
Both of these steps are integral phases of the 
method of "imputation," which is the main clue to the 
methodological aspects of the sociology of knowledge, the 
successful carrying out of which will eventually produce 
the concrete picture of the development of thought which 
has actually taken place. "This method," Mannheim asserts, 
1Ibid. 
-
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"offers the maximum reliability in the reconstruction of 
intellectual development, since it analy&es into its ele-
ments what at first was merely a summary impression of the 
course of intellectual history, and by reducing this im-
pression to explicit criteria makes possible a reconstruc-
tion of reality."1 This is accomplished chiefly because 
the sociology of knowledge seeks to single out what were 
previously "anonymous, unarticulated forces" which are 
operative in the development of thought. 
The controversies concerning the problems of impu-
tation (e.g., the problem of the ambivalent character of 
"mixed types," and the question of which mode they are to 
be imputed) are not to be seen as a refutation of the 
historical-sociological method, but are seen to reinforce 
his position. Mannheim points out, for example, that when 
questions arise as to whether the work of certain artists 
is imputable to the Rennaissance or to the Baroque period 
and style, this controversy by its very nature emphasizes 
the existence of specific, articulate modes of artistic 
expression, which themselves are the categories of analy-
sis.2 
1 !ill·' p. 308. 2tbid. 
-
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Mannheim has been criticized for not delimiting 
specific types of knowledge. 1 Thus he has raised problems, 
it is pointed out, regarding methodologies for dealing 
with such heterogeneous phenomena. Mannheim was very much 
aware of the methodological complexities, but was insistent 
upon maintaining the continuity and comprehensiveness of 
thought. For him various types of mental activity are con-
tinuous and contiguous, and he continually opposed any 
tendencies to treat the problem in a fragmented manner. 
The following statement is an expression of this concern: 
By constantly taking account of all the various types 
of knowledge, ranging from earlier intuitive impres-
sions to controlled observation, the sociology of 
knowledge seeks to obtain systematic comprehension of 
the relationship between social existence and thought. 
The whole life of an historical-social group presents 
itself as an interdependent configuration; thought is 
only its expression and the interaction between these 
two aspects of life is the essential element in the 
configuration, the detailed interconnections of which 
must be traced if it is to be understood.~ 
1cf. Merton, op. cit., p. 496f. for a discussion 
of this issue. 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 309. 
CHAPTER III 
EXPOSITION OF MANNHEIM'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
1. Mannheim' s Claims for Epistemological 
Relevance 
Mannheim insists that it is possible for one to 
accept the empirical results of the sociology of knowledge 
without drawing any epistemological conclusions. He does 
not say that this is a logical path or a desirable one, 
but merely that it is possible for one to do this. It 
simply means that on this assumption all epistemological 
problems have been avoided or pushed into the background, 
and this procedure involves a very artificial separation. 
The evidence presented under the discussion of particu-
larization ttscarcely permits an easy intellectual con-
science on this matter." The facts of particularization 
do not remain as mere facts, Mannheim contends, "but 
transcend bare fact and call for further epistemological 
reflection."1 
The empirical observation that the position of the 
observer influences ~ results of thought must sooner or 
1 Ibid., p. 286. 
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later lead one to raise the question as to the signifi-
cance of this observation for the field of epistemology. 
It should be emphasized at this point that Mannheim is not 
"anti-philosophical" or "anti-epistemological," as has 
sometimes been claimed by Watkins and others. 1 Mannheim 
approaches this problem as one whose first intellectual 
love was philosophy, and for whom to the end of his life, 
the implicit concerns of philosophy held his attention, 
even though at times he vigorously declaims certain kinds 
of philosophy. 
The claim is not that the sociology of knowledge 
will replace epistemological inquiry, but rather that it 
has made some relevant empirical discoveries which cannot 
be adequately dealt with until there has been a basic re-
vision of some of the current conceptions and prejudices 
of present-day epistemology. The sociological fact of 
particularization, which requires that we attribute only 
partial validity to particular assertions, provides that 
"new element" which compels the revision of fundamental 
presuppositions of modern epistemology. 2 "We are thus 
implicitly called upon," Mannheim insists, "to find an 
1Especially critical in this connection are the 
articles by J. W. N. Watkins, op. cit., pp. 258-59, and 
Hans Speier, op. cit., p. 155. 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 289. 
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epistemological foundation appropriate to these more varied 
modes of thought. Moreover we are required to find if pos-
sible a theoretical basis under which can be subsumed all 
the modes of thought which, in the course of history, we 
have succeeded in establishing."! 
Along with this claim is an argument for the recog-
nition of reciprocity between epistemology and the special 
sciences. Mannheim rejects as untenable the claim that 
epistemology must develop autonomously and independently of 
the progress of the special sciences. New forms of knowl-
edge, arising out of the social conditions of life, do not 
have to be first "legitimized" by an epistemology to 
demonstrate that they are possible. The reverse is actu-
ally true, according to Mannheim, 2 Since the development 
of the sciences and their respective theories grow out of 
the actual working with empirical data, and the fortunes 
of epistemology reflect the shifts and changes and realign-
ments already necessitated by revolutions in the empirical 
procedures for getting knowledge. 
1 Ibid., p. 290. 2 Ibid., p. 289. 
2. The "Positive Role" of Wissenssoziologie 
in Epistemological Issues 
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Mannheim sees the sociology of knowledge as hav-
ing a positive role concerning epistemological issues, not 
merely a negative role as most of his critics have assumed. 
Once we realize that although epistemology is the 
basis of all the empirical sciences, it can only de-
rive its principles from the data supplied by them, 
and once we realize, further, the extent to which 
epistemology has hitherto been profoundly influenced 
by the ideal of the exact sciences, then it is clearly 
our duty to inquire how the problem will be affected 
when other sciences are taken into consideration.! 
Several lines of argument then follow from this observation, 
and these Mannheim submits as legitimate epistemological 
implications deriving from the sociology of knowledge. 
i. Inevitability of the "Human Equation" 
First, it calls for a "revision of the thesis that 
the genesis of a proposition is under all circumstances 
irrelevant to its truth."2 This, he believes, is a radical 
challenge to the abrupt and absolute dualism between 
"validity" and "existence," and between "fact" and "value" 
which is characteristic respectively of most idealistic 
and positivistic epistemologies. In these two traditions 
such a dualism is regarded as impregnable and is, accord-
ing to Mannheim, "the most immediate obstacle to the 
1 Ibid., p. 292. 
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unbiased utilization of the findings of the sociology of 
knowledge." Mannheim's assertion is merely a plea for the 
recognition that the "human equation" is always present, 
requiring a new understanding of the knowledge problem. 
But it is not a weakness of our minds which prevents us 
from finding the truth: "even a god could not formulate a 
proposition on historical subjects like 2 x 2 = 4, for what 
is intelligible in history can be formulated only with 
reference to problems and conceptual constructions which 
themselves arise in the flux of historical experience."1 
ii. The Need for a New "Thought Model" 
Second, the revised epistemology calls for a new 
model of thought. The old epistemology was built upon the 
axioms taken over from the quantifiable sciences, and is 
for the most part an extension of the tendencies character-
istic of this limited form of knowledge. What is needed 
is a thought model which is appropriate to the qualitative 
sciences. This new model will be, presumably, inclusive 
of the wide range of types of knowledge (including the 
quantifiable sciences) which are at the disposal of the 
epistemologist. The present model, that based upon the 
quantifiable sciences, is exclusive, in that it is limited 
1 Ibid., p. 79. 
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only to a select type of knowledge. 1 
iii. The Activistic Element of Thought 
Third, a revised epistemology will take into account 
the activistic element of thought. The objective is not to 
attempt to eliminate this activistic, selective character 
of the process of thought, but rather to become aware of 
this activistic factor and to raise it into the sphere of 
the controllable. 2 
iv. Rejection of "Sphere of Truth" Notion 
Fourth, the proposed revised epistemology would dis-
card as its primary tenet the notion of a sphere of truth 
as such. 3 Mannheim objects that this positing of an "as 
suchn sphere of truth virtually strips humanity of every-
thing vital, corporeal, historical or social, since it is 
these very elements which current theory attempts to sub-
merge in its effort to deal with the problem of knowing. 
Mannheim's observation on this matter is very much to the 
point: 
1Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociolo'y of Knowl-
odfe, ed. and trans. by Paul~ecskemeti (Nework: oxford 
ersity Press, 1952), p. 189. 
2Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 295. 
3 ~., p. 297. 
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It is necessary to raise the question time and again 
whether we can imagine the concept of knowing without 
taking account of the whole complex of traits by which 
man is characterized, and how, without these presup-
positions we can even think of the concept of knowing, 
to say nothing of actually engaging in the act of 
knowing.! 
v. Relevance of the Perspectivistic Element 
Fifth, the revised epistemology will take fully 
into account the essentially perspectivistic element in 
certain types of knowledge. 2 Thus, in certain types of 
historical-social knowledge it will be considered not only 
as quite natural but quite inevitable that a given conclu-
sion should contain the traces of the existential position 
of the knower. "The problem," according to Mannheim, "lies 
not in trying to hide these perspectives or in apologizing 
for them, but in inquiring into the question of how, 
granted these perspectives, knowledge and objectivity are 
still possible."3 He states this affirmative position in 
still another way: 
The problem is not how we might arrive at a non-
perspectivistic picture but how, by juxtaposing the 
various points of view, each perspective may be recog-
nized as such and thereby a new level of objectivity 
attained. Thus we come to the point where the false 
ideal of a detached, impersonal point of view must be 
replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point of 
view which is within the limits of a hvman perspective 
constantly striving to enlarge itself.4 
1 Ibid., p. 297. 
3Ibid. 
-
2Ibid., p. 296. 
4Ibid., p. 297. 
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3. Objectivity Redefined 
What is here proposed is what might be termed a 
highly refined subjectivity, freed as far as possible from 
the illusion of "absolute objectivity," as sensitized as 
possible to the subjective and human elements which are in-
herent in it, as internally coherent as human limitations 
permit it to be. Thus refined, it offers a new orienta-
tion toward the meaning of objectivity, newly defined by 
a humanized epistemology. Mannheim makes it emphatically 
clear that this solution does not imply renunciation of 
the postulate of objectivity. 1 It does not deny the pos-
sibility of arriving at decisions in factual disputes. It 
does not involve the acceptance of fictionalism or illu-
sionism. It does not assert that objects are non-existent. 
It does not conclude that reliance upon observation is 
useless and futile. And finally: 
The result even here is not relativism in the sense 
of one assertion being as good as another. Rela-
tionism, as we use it, states that every assertion 
can only be relationally formulated. It becomes 
relativism only when it is linked with the older 
static ideal of eternal, unperspectivistic truths 
independent of the subjective experience of the 
observer, and when it is judged by this alien ideal 
of absolute truth.2 
1 Ibid., p. 301. 2 Ibid. , p . 300 • 
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These claims are not a denial of the importance of 
epistemology, for Mannhetm insists that epistemological 
presuppositions are basically involved in every scientific 
pursuit, and he urges that persons in the respective sci-
ences proceed with the business of examining these presup-
positions upon which they operate. He makes this interest 
explicit by asserting that: "To every factual form of 
knowledge belongs a theoretical foundation." 1 Mannheim is 
prepared to examine his own theoretical position, and 
makes a serious effort to hold himself accountable for the 
epistemological implications for which he has insisted that 
others be held accountable. This is evident in the pro-
posals which he has made for the new lines of epistemolog-
ical development. Most significant in this regard are the 
directions which he has pointed with respect to the problem 
of "validity," the meaning of "objectivity," and the pos-
sibility of a new orientation to the problem. 
4. Perspectival Validity 
Mannheim's position, it was noted, offered a medi-
ating position with respect to the problem of interpreting 
the "validity" of a given "perspective." "Perspective," 
1 Ibid., p. 290. 
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as here used, signifies the manner in which one views an 
object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it 
in his thinking; it is something more than a merely formal 
determination of thinking. The problem is now to see how, 
in terms of Mannheim's conception of knowledge, one may 
identify the perspective which is valid from the ones which 
are not valid. What are the criteria to be utilized in 
this new conception of truth? Mannheim discusses several 
such criteria. 
i. Criterion of Unanimity 
Insofar as different observers are identified with 
the same perspective, and utilize the same conceptual and 
categorial apparatus (as in a highly controlled experiment), 
they will be able to arrive at similar results and be in a 
position to eradicate as an error everything which deviates 
from this unanimity. 1 It is supposed that what will be 
seen by all observers sharing the same point of view really 
exists in the thing being observed, and thus is merely a 
means of suppressing the personal equation and establishing 
"authentic socially conditioned knowledge." 2 Mannheim as-
sumes that "sharing the same point of view'' is possible, 
within limits, and this is a methodological problem which 
1 Ibid., p. 300. 
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is not beyond solution. 1 
ii. Criterion of Perspectival Synthesis 
The problem here becomes more difficult, since we 
now have several views of the same thing emanating from 
different perspectives. Mannheim attempts to show how we 
attain a certain objectivity by comparing different per-
spectives. In such a case, what bas been correctly but 
differently perceived by the different perspectives must be 
understood in the light of the differences in structure of 
these varied modes of perception. He maintains that an ef-
fort must be made to find a formula for translating the 
results of one into those of the other and to discover a 
common denominator for these varying perspectival insights. 
"Once such a common denominator has been found, it is pos-
sible to separate the necessary differences of the varying 
views from the arbitrarily conceived and mistaken elements, 
which here too should be considered as errors."2 
Does this procedure of seeking a common denominator 
leave one with a residue (i.e., what can be seen from any 
point of view) or, on the contrary, does it imply the cre-
ation of a new, larger perspective which will synthesize 
the previous ones? Mannheim appears to conceive of an 
1 Ibid., p. 301 • 
........... 
2 Ibid., p. 300. 
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integration of points of view into a dynamic synthesis, an 
emerging ever-more-comprehensive progressive synthesis. 
He is not at all clear concerning just how this is to come 
about. 1 He refers this, presumably, to his dialectical 
historicism, which might be proposed to resolve the problem. 
iii. Criterion of the Best Perspective 
One is still facing the problem of "objectivity" 
when he is confronted with different perspectives. He must 
then ask which of the various points of view is the best. 
For this, too, Mannheim suggests a criterion: "As in the 
case of the visual perspective, where certain positions 
have the advantage of revealing the decisive features of 
the object, so here pre-eminence is given to that perspec-
tive which gives evidence of the greatest comprehensiveness 
and greatest fruitfulness in dealing with empirical mater-
ials."2 
The best point of view will then be that which is 
the broadest and the most fruitful. He has already defined 
the broadest perspective as the one which, going beyond op-
positions, permits a synthesis. On the other hand, the 
point of view which is must fruitful is the one which 
1 ~·' p. 301. 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 301. 
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allows the most adequate adjustment of the action to the 
objective we wish to obtain. According to Mannheim's po-
sition, it would appear, moreover, that an idea may be said 
to be fruitful, or efficient, when it allows either conduct 
adapted to the situation in which it develops ~' on the 
other hand, when it permits the effective preparation of a 
future social order. "A theory then is wrong," Mannheim 
writes, "if, in a given practical situation, it uses con-
cepts and categories which, if taken seriously, would pre-
vent man from adjusting himself at that historical stage."1 
Thus, lacking unanimity in perspective, that 
perspective is the best one which, at a given moment of 
history, gives the possibility for the broadest synthesis, 
and permits the best adaptation to the situation. At this 
point again, however, this formulation in terms of making 
the "best adaptation to the situation" begs the question 
at hand, which is now: "Best with reference to what 
objectives?" Mannheim has here thrown open the whole axi-
ological question which is to be dealt with in subsequent 
sections of this dissertation. Does he, at this point, 
throw the reader back upon a set of metaphysical presup-
positions? This axiological question can only be resolved 
upon further examination of Mannheim's own sociological 
1 ~·' p. 95. 
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perspective and a critical analysis of his social philosophy, 
to discover What really are his presuppositions with regard 
to value, and the connection, if any, between these axiolog-
ical presuppositions and his sociological presuppositions. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF VALUE COMPONENTS IN MANNHEIM'S 
WRITINGS 
Introduction 
This chapter will present an analysis of the value 
components in Mannheim's writings. A preliminary word 
should be said about the semantic problem involved in such 
an analysis of Mannheim's work, especially as it pertains 
to the problem of value and to the many substitute terms 
which Mannheim uses to refer to the value dimensions of 
human experience. A brief summary of the terms which he 
uses to designate the value aspects of experience would 
include the following: value, valuation, aim, goal, goal-
direction, attitude, objective, interest, virtues, quali-
ties, cultural aspects, morals, sentiments, proper ends, 
social codes, conduct patterns, way of life, ideology, 
utopia. Some of these terms may appear to be rather 
spurious items to include in such a list, and yet their 
use by Mannheim in specific contexts reveal that he is 
referring to the valuational side of experience, and he 
often uses the above terms interchangeably with the word 
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value. 
In the more detailed analysis that follows, the con-
textual use of these terms will be evident. The very am-
biguity of the terms themselves, and Mannheim's interchange-
able use of such terms, constitute a real part of the prob-
lem. 
The following analysis of categories will attempt 
to establish as clearly as possible the context of Mannheim's 
own usage and his intended meanings. The purpose of this 
analysis is to attempt to extract from Mannheim's sociolog-
ical system the value components that are evident, and 
operative, in that system. 
1. Value--Intrinsic and Instrumental 
The instrumental character of value is readily ap-
parent in much of Mannheim's writing. In much of his dis-
cussion about "the value situation" or "the value-generating 
situation," value is largely identified with goal-seeking 
activity. 
Mannheim at one point distinguishes what he claims 
to be "the philosophical" and "the sociological" interpre-
tation of values. 1 After asking "What are values?" he then 
1Karl Mannheim, SSstematic Sociology (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 19 8), p. 131. 
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proceeds to explain that "to the idealist philosopher--
even to the man in the street--they present themselves as 
eternal qualities, as gifts or commands from Heaven, as 
transcendental forces." On the contrary, to the sociol-
ogist they are "part and parcel of the social process--
functions of the social process." Further he states that 
to the sociologist values are "neither abstract entities 
nor intrinsic qualities" of an object. 1 In short, one 
cannot meaningfully talk about values at all apart from a 
valuing subject. 
In Mannheim's basic setting of what he terms the 
value-generating situation, he sees three factors: organ-
ism, situation, and object. 2 The "object," he explains, 
refers to values, goals, or interests,which he does not 
basically differentiate. The organism is necessary to 
give real meaning to the idea of value. The situation pro-
vides the necessary context for action, within which the 
organism makes a particular act of judgment and selection. 
Mannheim gives a further elaboration of this goal-oriented 
or interest-directed activity of the individual. 
We can start by considering an object of interest 
from the point of view of its subjective element. 
Once my interest has focussed on the object, however, 
the objective relationship between the object and me 
becomes more and more important. In this broader 
1Ibid. 
-
2 Ibid., p. 133. 
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sense we can speak about interest in cultural objects, 
like a philosophy. In this case interest means ob-jects which enlist our attention. 
From interest, in the sense that I am "interested 
in" a thing, we must distinguish interest which has 
the special implication of personal advantage, which 
we sometimes call self-interest. As an instance of 
this I may want to get the greatest amount possible 
in the fields of power, prestige or economic gain. It 
is principally the wish for advantage which urges me 
to purposive activities. This means that interest 
compels me to organise my behaviour to attain this 
given end of calculation, and in this case we can 
speak about the second sense of interest mentioned 
earlier, rational interest. This implies calculation 
and striving for a given end and is a complex form of 
adjustment, because calculation implies choosing the 
means which lead most effectively to that end in the 
shortest way with the greatest economy of effort. 
"It implies a positive control over the sources neces-
sary to carry purposes into effect and possession of 
the means to satisfy desires and the trained powers 
of mind and particularly of initiative and reflection 
required for free preference and for circumspect and 
farseeing desires."l 
In this rather definitive statement by Mannheim, he 
has set the problem very clearly in terms of a means-ends 
situation. He has further suggested a differentiation of 
the means-value and the end-value. There is not only the 
question of determining the ends to be sought, but there 
is, simultaneously, the question of determining the proper 
means of achieving those ends. 
The value of the means is determined by the nature 
of the ends, which require a certain kind of organized 
1 Ibid., p. 37. Mannheim's quoted source is not 
identifiecr:--
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of the term intrinsic in that instance was equated with 
independent, that is, independent of a valuing subject. 
This he firmly rejects. He does however, use the word 
intrinsic on other occasions to refer to the goals and 
values which individuals or groups are seeking to fulfill. 
He refers, for example, to certain cultural patterns which 
are "intrinsically good," or to certain attitudes as 
"intrinsically worth while." He speaks of "doctrinal dis-
putes and fights for intrinsic values." 1 Again, he sees 
the task of modern education to be the cultivation of 
types which "have the capacity to sublimate, to strive for 
intrinsic values."2 He thus uses the word intrinsic as 
identifying a certain value category, without at all imply-
ing any independence of such intrinsic value from a valu-
ing subject. Hence, it seems appropriate to use his word 
to designate the category of ends, goals, interests which 
appear in the value-situation, ~ as independent of any 
valuing subject, but also as not necessarily externally 
related to other values or other objects of valuation. 
In short, there are goods and there are goods for achieving 
those goods. Intrinsic values appear to refer generally to 
1Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Aye of Recon-
struction (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,954), 
p. 67. 
2 Ibid., p. 203. 
actual qualities of experience, in contrast to normative 
values, which will be discussed later. 
Is there further evidence that Mannheim involves 
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in his thinking, consciously or not, implicitly or other-
wise, the category of intrinsic values? He speaks of 
"cultural products as they are given in immediacy."l Also, 
in the same paragraph he refers to cultural products "as 
they present themselves when we grasp them adequately as 
value objects in the immediate, unreflected approach to 
the value in question." Then he continues by discussing 
the structure of the "cultural product taken in immediacy," 
and outlines the characteristic features of this "immedi-
ately given structure."2 He appears to be saying that such 
cultural products, such "value objects," (literary, 
aesthetic, technological, or otherwise) present themselves 
as immediate, unreflected value to a valuing subject, i.e., 
the valuer prizes them for their own sake. 
Is there an intuitive theory operating here? Is 
this compatible with an earlier-quoted statement that 
values are "part and parcel of the social process--
p. 64. 
1Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
2 
Ibid. 
-
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functions of the social process"?1 Does Mannheim mean that 
values are exclusively functions of the social process, 
totally dependent upon and varying with the social process? 
Or can they be both? 
The problem of the relation between his intrinsic 
and instrumental values is reflected most clearly in an 
illustration which Mannheim uses in an introductory study 
of value, in a chapter called "The Philosophical and Socio-
logical Interpretation of Values." The illustration is in-
tended to demonstrate his approach to the understanding of 
value, as contrasted with the theological and philosophical 
approach "which appeals to the thought habits of men ac-
customed to act under authority." 2 
Let us take a very simple concrete situation in 
which valuation occurs. I wish to drive a nail into 
a piece of wood and I therefore look at everything in 
terms of its "hammer value"--that is to say, measure 
its capacity to meet the special situation. I try 
out different objects; some of them are effective and 
become active factors in the context of my life. In 
this case, as in other cases, there is no abstract 
value, but certain things become valuable in the con-
text of a certain activity, through performing a de-
sired function. As a matter of fact the "hammer 
value" corresponds to an emotionalization of certain 
functions which become important in our lives. That 
is to say, the value is not inherent in any object 
or activity as such, but each may become valuable if 
it becomes necessary and therefore emphasized in the 
context of life.j 
1Mannheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 131. 
2!ill., p. 132. 3Ibid. 
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It is important to note that in the context of this 
discussion, no attention whatever is paid to the purpose 
for which the nail was to be driven into the wood. What is 
the end, the goal, the structure prized for its own sake, 
for which "hammer value" or instrumental value is sought? 
The most significant clue to his understanding of the 
value situation, in this instance, is the conclusion which 
he draws above, viz., that "the value is not inherent in 
any object or activity as such, but each may become valu-
able if it becomes necessary and therefore emphasized in 
the context of life." 
It would be a mistake to infer too much from a 
single such illustration, but this example is submitted as 
basically representative of Mannheim's areas of emphasis 
and of de-emphasis. Basically, he tends much of the time 
toward a predominantly instrumentalist approach. Meanwhile, 
as in the above illustration, the intrinsic value (of house, 
or whatever the nail and hammer were intended for) is only 
implicit. 
Moreover, because Mannheim feels convinced that 
sociology is the discipline which can analyze the "hammer 
value," the instrumental values of society, he concludes 
that this discipline should thus become the rightful cus-
todian of the values of society. 
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What will really happen will be that the theological 
and philosophical obligation will be replaced by a 
sociological one. The theological and to a large 
extent the philosophical justification of values 
appeals to the thought habits of men accustomed to 
act under authority, whilst the sociological approach 
appeals to the democratically educated man because 
the social obligation can be reasonably tested. An-
other advantage of the sociological concept is that 
it both explains the obligation and opens the door 
to reforms, whereas the1old absolute conception rendered reform slower. 
Immediately the questions arise: "Social obligation" to 
what? and, "Reasonably tested" against what? 
Mannheim has a somewhat unsteady confidence in just 
what achievements sociology is capable of producing. In 
contrast to the above-quoted confidence in the sociological 
justification of values, he mentions in another place the 
difficulty which his sociological historicism does encounter 
in determining the proper goals or ends of human beings. 
Now we do not want to deny that historicism does en-
counter difficulties--and they arise precisely at 
this point. For while we can see the meaning, the 
goal-directedness of the overall development in so 
far as closed periods are concerned, we cannot see 
such a goal-meaning for our own period. Since the 
future is always a secret, we can only make con-jectures about the total pattern of meaning of which 
our present is a part; ... 2 
1 Ibid., p. 132. 
2Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 172. 
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What then is to determine these goals or end-values? 
Mannheim seems on the one hand to be saying that they are 
mere conjectures. On the other hand, he seems to be declar-
ing that sociology can somehow provide a "sociological 
justification." 
Mannheim has set forth, in numerous discussions of 
value and the value-generating situation, both the instru-
mental and intrinsic character of value. He appears at 
times to be a thoroughgoing functionalist or instrumentalist, 
somewhat indifferent to the existence of intrinsic values. 
At other times, he seems to give attention to both the 
instrumental and intrinsic values of human experience. 
Basically, he appears to recognize an organic connection 
between the two. 
Human nature as a whole will always be determined by 
the structure and nature of the goal which man sets 
himself to attain, since out of this goal comes the 
thread which links together the whole chain of his 
conduct.l 
Man's goals, and the thread of conduct which con-
stitutes the means orienting the individual toward those 
goals, are organically related. These are the intrinsic 
and instrumental values of his system. Mannheim is gener-
ally very conscious of the polarities of existence, and he 
recognizes that instrumental values are inconceivable apart 
1Ibid. , p. 258. 
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from some intrinsic goods or ultimate values toward which 
they are aimed at producing or achieving. Contrariwise, 
he is very conscious of the fact that intrinsic values, 
sheer goals, apart from any actualizing process, are mean-
ingless abstractions. This is evident in his rather forth-
right reaction against certain abstract idealistic systems, 
which, as noted earlier, he tends to equate with all phil-
osophy. 
In assessing the instrumentalist character of 
Mannheim's thought, and his frequent tendency to rely 
heavily upon a functionalist approach, there are nonethe-
less occasional remonstrances against functionalism and 
pragmatism. Here Mannheim passes his own critical judgment 
upon the limitations and the dangers of functionalism. 
The Romantics and their contemporary disciples were 
defending the unsophisticated immediateness of human 
experience, the desire to accept things simply as 
they presented themselves. People and things exist 
in their own right and not simply as functions of 
other entities. Their very existence is a fulfill-
ment of their inner nature. The only proper way to 
treat them is to approach them directly and not by 
roundabout routes, as a function of something else. 
In the same way, spiritual experiences, whether moral 
or religious, once reverenced as transcendent reali-
ties, are in the modern approach deprived of their 
true nature when they are conceived as artefacts. The 
functional approach no longer regards ideas and moral 
standards as absolute values, but as products of the 
social process, which can if necessary be changed by 
scientific guidance combined with political practice. 
This Romanticist criticism is undoubtedly a pro-
found one, and will still preserve its value in the 
future. Its task is to remind us continually of the 
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limitation of the functional approach and of the danger 
of its becoming universal. The functional approach is 
only one of the many the human mind has created, and 
the world would be the poorer if it were fo replace our 
more genuine ways of approaching reality. 
As conscious as Mannheim was of the limits and dangers of 
universalizing the functional approach, the question re-
mains as to why he then proceeded to universalize it him-
self, thus subsuming at times the domains of philosophy, 
theology, and other specialized disciplines, and replacing 
what he called "our more genuine ways of approaching real-
ity" with a sociological approach. 
Nevertheless, the inquiry into the intrinsic and 
instrumental character of value has thus far given ~ 
indication of how intrinsic values, or goals, are to be 
selected, judged, or identified. What has been suggested 
by Mannheim on occasion is a self-revealing immediacy of 
such values. Alongside of this, there is his assertion 
of a sociological justification, but thus far no indica-
tion by him as to how this justification is to occur. 
2. Value--Inclusive and Exclusive 
Mannheim gives considerable attention to what may 
be termed the inclusive and exclusive character of value. 
~annheim, Man and Society in an Age of Recon-
struction, p. 241. 
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Again, as in the discussion of instrumental and intrinsic 
character of value, Mannheim's thought ranges widely across 
the whole field of cultural products (intellectual, reli-
gious, aesthetic, and technological). The terms inclusive 
and exclusive are not here being set over against intrin-
sic and instrumental values, as if it were an either/or 
situation. The point is not to suggest that values are 
either one or the other, but rather that all are, in one 
way or another, varying dimensions of the value experience. 
The term inclusive is here used to suggest values 
that encompass other values, as a whole encompasses its 
parts, and as shared experience of values encompasses the 
experience of more than one person. Hence, inclusive 
refers not to any supreme set of values in an absolute 
sense, but rather to varying levels of comprehensiveness, 
as varying wholes may be parts of larger wholes. Exclu-
sive values, on the other hand, refer to the particular-
istic character of value. Such values are limited to a 
particular person, or serve a partial or particular end, 
or are embodied in and experienced by a particular and 
limited group. In the sense here indicated, these terms 
refer to an important aspect of Mannheim's understanding 
of the value situation. 
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For example, in discussing the values of demo-
cratization, Mannheim points out that the vertical relation-
ships involved in a stratified society may produce an in-
clusiveness on certain limited levels. The social values 
of a given professional group, such as doctors, provide a 
cohesive element and sustain the life of that particular 
group, i.e., they are inclusive of that professional group. 
However, they are simultaneously exclusive and particular-
istic, in that they do not encompass other social groups, 
other persons in society. Democratization, on the contrary, 
involves the value of the person-to-person relationship--a 
horizontal rather than a vertical relationship--and as 
such involves value experiences which transcend (i.e., they 
are inclusive of) the vertical relationships and the lim-
ited inclusiveness that was involved in that stratifica-
tion. "The real opportunity that democratization gives 
us," he writes, "consists in being able to transcend all 
social categories and experience love as a purely personal 
and existential matter. nl 
Elsewhere, in a discussion of the value of compe-
tition and cooperation, he points out that competition has 
its own range of inclusiveness, in producing certain 
~annheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
p. 243. 
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positive structural tensions in certain types of social set-
tings. But, on the other hand, competition also is "a force 
which compels people to act against one another," i.e., to 
seek values which are exclusive and particularistic. 1 Co-
operation, Mannheim believes, is essentially inclusive, en-
compassing and embracing other values, such as "like-
mindedness, sympathy, mutual helpfulness," which are "im-
portant integrating forces."2 But all of these in turn, 
Mannheim acknowledges, have a more ultimate value referent, 
a "connnon external purpose" which can guide persons to a 
more complete integration. 3 
The valuational side of experience is often ex-
pressed by Mannheim in terms of general social forces and 
processes "which either bring people together (these are the 
integrating forces) or urge them to act against one an-
other."4 But these should not be taken to mean that in-
clusive values are to be strictly equated with "good" and 
that exclusive values are to be equated with "evil." He 
recognizes that certain levels of inclusiveness may involve 
simultaneously both positive and negative elements. 
1Mannheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 89. 
2Ibid. 3Ibid. 
- -
4 Ibid., p. 103. 
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Speaking of the fascist countries, he acknowledges not only 
their "brutal methods" and "primitive impulses," but also 
points out that "in one respect the Fascist countries are 
superior to the liberal states." 
The crisis through which they are passing has com-
pelled them to make some attempt to solve the psy-
chological problems of modern mass society, particu-
larly unemployment ••• [Fascism] does at least try, 
however brutal its methods, to remove the psycho-
logical effects of permanent unemployment.1 
He cites the instance of the German authorities who 
succeeded in abolishing the hatred of Poland "for as long 
as they wished in a very short space of time" as an example 
of the "positive value" of German fascism. 2 He comments 
also upon the values of a particularistic cultural heritage, 
and the unifying positive values which may accompany the 
level of inclusiveness manifested by fascist society. 
As regards the modern movements of mass ecstasy, 
an entirely negative policy towards them would be 
futile. It is unlikely that there should be no 
positive values compatible with such unifying emo-
tions on a large scale. They represent a kind of 
shared experience, and the proper question to ask 
is whether their spiritualization instead of sheer 
emotionalization would be feasible. After all, a 
Cathedral Mass is also a spiritualized collective 
ecstatic experience. The problem, therefore, is 
rather to find new forms of spiritualization than 
completely to deny the potentialities inherent 
1Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
!!fm., p • 258 • 
2 ~·' p. 260. 
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in the new forms of group existence. 1 
Thus Mannheim does not equate exclusiveness or in-
clusiveness with negative or positive value, as such, but 
seeks rather to find the kinds of inclusiveness and the 
kinds of particularism which are ultimately compatible. 
What is desired is the "emancipated individual." Such a 
person is one who can discriminate between and among the 
various levels of inclusiveness and the different kinds of 
particularistic values, and move toward a more "compre-
hensive integration of the world." 
We may call a person "emancipated" who does not 
think in terms of "my country--right or wrong," 
who is not a chauvinist expecting his parish church 
to be the most magnificent in the world. He 
achieves emancipation by partial uprooting, ~ 
selecting for personal identification onlf certain 
traditions and values of his community. Italics 
mine.] In so doing fie-aces-not shut out the 
character-forming influences of community partici-
pation, nor does he sacrifice his right to inde-
pendent thought and personal development. He is 
emancipated because he is always ready to move to-
ward a more comprehensive integration of the world 
but he does so without turning cosmopolitan by de-
nouncing his solidarity with his nation. The eman-
cipated person shares the fate of his country but 
his vision reaches beyond the sacro-e~oismo of 
modern nationalism. An increasing num~er of eman-
cipated citizens in all camps can 2elp to bring 
about an integrated world for all. 
1Karl Mannheim, Diafnosis of Our Time (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 19 4), p. 161. 
2Karl Mannheim, Freedom 2 Power, and Democratic Planning (New York: Oxford Urilversity Press, 1950), p. 63. 
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Further aspects of these levels of inclusiveness 
and types of particularistic values, are discussed by 
Mannheim in regard to the values of asceticism, 1 demo-
cratization and commercialism, 2 laissez-faire and social 
disorganization, 3 social coordination and conformity, 4 
limited valuational perspectives, 5 pacifist virtues and 
militarist virtues,6 BBC programming and class stratifi-
cation.7 In each of these instances the problem of in-
clusiveness (or shared values), and exclusiveness (or 
particularistic values), is a significant part of Mannheim's 
discussion, even though set within varying frameworks of 
discussion. 
This discussion of the inclusive and exclusive 
character of value is not intended to imply any kind of 
1Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 156. 
~nheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 264. 
tion, 
~nheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 105. 
~eim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
pp. 262-263. 
5Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 152. 
6Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 355. 
7Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 45. 
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static character in the value of experience. On the con-
trary, this entire discussion has to be seen against the 
background of what Mannheim refers to as a "dynamic social 
ontology," with its constant flux and change of human 
experience. This aspect of change will be more fully 
elaborated in a succeeding section, but it is important to 
note at this point the relationship of inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness to this flux and change of human experience. 
It is this multi-faceted character of value, inclusive and 
exclusive, with positive and negative implications, which 
constitutes the core of tension and conflict which is at 
the heart of human value experience, and of which Mannheim 
is very much aware. 
He notes the "disturbances in the process of valua-
tion" caused by "the contacts between formerly separated 
value areas."1 Various political forms and varying social 
patterns, representing cultural values, "arise in the 
dynamic unfolding of conflicting forces." 2 He insists that 
we can no longer view democracy as "the sum-total of ideal 
aspirations contrasting with an imperfect reality," but 
rather as a dynamic struggle between competing values, the 
1 Ibid., p. 24. 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 171. 
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advanced form of which is a "constantly renewed attempt at 
synthesis of all the existing perspectives aiming at a 
dynamic reconciliation."1 
Competition, like struggle, is a universal cate-
gory of life--in biology we speak about a struggle for 
life--and it is a general category of social life. 
Many people believe that competition is a purely eco-
nomic phenomenon mainly represented by barter. But 
nothing could be more wrong than this limitation of 
the meaning of the word. The principle of competition 
is equally at work when any kind of race takes place, 
the common end being for each of several competitors 
to try to reach the the goal first. But there is also 
competition when two different scientific schools at-
tempt to solve the same problem, or if two men wish to 
marry the same woman. It is important to see that 
these different things all belong together ~ecause 
competition is at work in all these fields. 
Competition, then, is seen by Mannheim to be a ma-
jor facet of the basic dimension of conflict in the social 
matrix within which human valuation occurs. Value con-
flicts also occur between the varying norms established 
by groups and institutions within society, producing a 
valuational schizophrenia within the members of that so-
ciety. 
The Church, for instance, preaches that it is wrong 
to kill; the State, that to do so may sometimes be 
a man's highest duty. The family teaches the idea 
of brotherly love, whereas society presents the 
same individual with situations to which egotism, 
if not hatred, is the only adequate response. Indeed, 
1~. 
~annheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 76. 
it is not wholly wrong to speak of our times as a 
"neurotic age," neurosis being its characteristic 
illness, provoked by a series of institutionalized 
conflicts.! 
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Thus Mannheim's conception of value appears to be 
anything but a static view, but rather one of conflict, 
competition, integral cooperation, struggle for survival, 
within the context of a constantly changing social real-
ity. 
Having acknowledged these aspects of tension within 
the human value experience, Mannheim also insists that 
these forces cannot of themselves resolve the conflict that 
has resulted. Society organized in a hierarchical manner, 
based upon inequality, rooted in perpetual conflict of 
interests, and aiming at conflicting goals, "cannot last 
long, because these inequalities will create so great a 
tension in society that it will be impossible to establish 
even that minimum of tacit consent which is the conditio 
sine ~ !!.2.!! of the functioning of a system. 112 Such ten-
sion, indefinitely perpetuated and perennially unresolved, 
leads to chaos, loss of meaning, and a moral or valuational 
1Karl Mannheim, Essa~s on Sociology and Social 
Pslchology, ed. by Paul Kecs emeti (New York: oxford 
Un versity Press, 1953), p. 259. 
~annheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
lli!l, p. 364. 
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sickness of the individual and the entire social organism. 
In seeking for a solution to this problem of "dis-
placement and disturbance in our value systems," Mannheim 
suggests that "synthesis" and "integration" and "dynamic 
reconciliation" are possible, and that these are the desir-
able alternatives. These valuational processes each pre-
suppose the goals of "unity," "wholeness," and "harmony," 
which are, in fact, Mannheim's valuational presuppositions 
in this entire discussion. 
As he seeks to set forth the problem of conflict-
ing values and their reconciliation, it is evident that 
Mannheim has his own order for the hierarchy of values. 
He introduces certain ultimate values, upon which hinge his 
hierarchy of values and his judgment in ordering the "cul-
tural products" of society, and toward which point the 
processes of "synthesis," "integration," and "dynamic 
reconciliation." 
Communists and Fascists also plan society, but they 
destroy the values of Western civilization and abolish 
Freedom, Democracy and respect for Personality. In 
contrast to this solution, the democratic form of 
planning will do everyt~ing to make planning compat-
ible with these values. 
It is important, he points out, that as many keen 
minds as possible be brought together, in order that their 
~annheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 144. 
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perspectives be brought into a synthesis and their "iso-
lated activities correlated through an integrating vision 
of the pattern as a whole." Even so, it is his values (his 
assumed "ultimates" of freedom, democracy, personality, 
unity, harmony, wholeness) which inform his proposed method 
for arriving at a truly integrated vision. Elsewhere, he 
writes that nothing can be saved from the "wreckage of 
liberalism" except "its values, among others, the belief 
in a free personality." "Thus the old ideal of freedom 
can only be attained by the technique of planning for 
freedom."1 These values are Mannheim's own ultimately in-
clusive values, and the basic starting points of his so-
cial theory. But, being inclusive, they are also particu-
laristic. Being universal in their inclusiveness, they 
thus pertain to every person in a specific and particular-
istic way. "Democracy as a political institution," 
Mannheim writes, "is a projection on to the organizational 
plane of the principle of brotherhood, everyone being 
equal at least in political rights and opportunities."2 
The broader the base of inclusiveness, the more universal 
are the possibilities of particularistic values. 
1Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 364. 
2Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 151. 
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Mannheim suggests that the awareness of different 
levels of inclusive and exclusive values can help lead to 
the rational mastery of these values, through a sustained 
and articulate attempt to bring "synthesis," "integration," 
and "value reconciliation." Again, he sets forth a large 
task for sociology in asserting that "political sociology 
in this sense must be conscious of its function as the 
fullest possible synthesis of the tendencies of an epoch."1 
Further, it is the task of sociology "to teach what alone 
is teachable, namely, structural relationships; the judg-
ments themselves cannot be taught but we can interpret 
them. " 2 
He urges a greater emphasis upon "the appreciation 
of those fundamental values which ultimately integrate 
groups, and on those fundamental values which are the 
products of the historical life of the community, and on 
new ideals which aim at the just reconstruction of so-
ciety."3 But what are the difficulties if varying groups 
disagree about which "fundamental values" are the genuine 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 164. 
2Ibid. 
~annheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 357. 
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legacy of the historical life of the community? What is to 
resolve the problem of synthesis and integration when cer-
tain groups do not begin with the axiomatic values of 
freedom, democracy, and personality? Mannheim notes that 
the authoritarian personality which strongly emphasizes the 
exclusive and dogmatic values of status and role "could 
never embark upon the venture of integrating various groups," 
that is, seek ever-more-inclusive values. There is finally, 
in Mannheim's assumptions, a voluntaristic requirement for 
the resolution of the value conflict arising out of the 
multi-leveled value experiences. 
Only a society that deliberately sets out ~ create 
personalities who feel su££icientry-8ecure to take the 
risk of losing themselves will be capable of regenera-
tion in the process of socialization. The dynamic 
idea of socialization is therefore not based exclusively 
on strict conformity and rote, as was the case in 
tribal societies, but on a continuous search for an 
emergent new truth in the dynamic process of CD= --
operation-ror the common good.l [Italics mine.] 
3. Value--Permanence and Change 
Mannheim recognizes an organic unity between the 
factors of change and permanence, as these factors reveal 
themselves in the goals and values of human life, and in 
~annheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 245. 
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the social, political, economic, and cultural processes 
which constitute human history. "The substance of 
history--whether we call it life or reality--does not oc-
cur intermittently but as an unbroken stream of actions."1 
This is true, Mannheim states, whether we are talking about 
revolutions inspired by utopian values, or scientific dis-
coveries aimed at the solution of given problems, or legis-
lative acts oriented toward social goals, or literary 
events, or any human "activities which provide for food, 
shelter, health, education, safety, the maintenance of 
order, and so forth." 2 Continuity of life is possible 
only through an articulation of these value-laden "per-
manent functions." History is not merely a record of 
events, not merely a listing of discrete happenings, but 
"the narrating of events in the particular context of 
continuing functions," thus making the account of change 
continuous. 3 
p. 
The farther we get away from the world of rigid 
"things," the closer we get to the actual histor-
ical substratum of psychic and intellectual real-
ity, the more we shall doubt the validity of such 
ostensibly supra-temporal attempts at splitting 
up reality which concentrate all chan~e on one 
side and all permanence on the other. 
~nheim, Essa:fS on the Sociolog:f of Culture, 
2Ibid. 3Ibid. 
- -
p. 
~annheim, Essa:fS on the Sociolog:f of Knowledge, 
92. 
36. 
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Mannheim protests against any tendency towards a 
"disembodied notion of history' which "bedevilled the 
'dialectics' of the post-Hegelian reflections on history."1 
While he agrees that the "evolving mind is the spark and 
substance of history," he is not willing to speak of the 
"dialectics of history per !!_, without any thought of 
what it is that moves or evolves in the stated antithetical 
forms." 2 
History is then not a substantive, but an attribute 
of an evolving collectivity; it is not only a record 
of change, but also an account of that which changes. 
History conceived without its social medium is like mo-
tion perceived without that which is moving.3 
Speaking specifically of values, Mannheim points out that 
by "stability" he does not mean uneventfulness or mere 
personal security of individuals, but rather the "relative 
fixity of the existing total social structure, which 
guarantees the stability of the dominant values and ideas."4 
Values which stabilize or conserve the social struc-
ture are not necessarily positive or negative; they may be 
either, or both. Such values are positive insofar as they 
preserve the ongoingness of life and the maintenance of 
1Mannheim, Essa;IS on the Sociolog;I of Culture, 
p. 38. 
2Ibid. 3 37. Ibid., p. 
-
4Mannheim, Ideologi and Utopia, p. 85. 
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identity and continuity, in persons and in social groups. 
Most of the values embodied in custom and law, and repre-
senting certain norms of social life, function in such a 
manner, providing cohesion and stability. They provide 
the basis for personal valuations, and in varying degrees 
the source of authority for such valuations. 1 
Mannheim points out that the positive values of a 
given tradition can only be fully realized when one both 
lives in it and at the same time is sufficiently distant 
from it to see those elements of the past that are relevant 
to the present, as well as those which are not relevant. 
"It may be well worth heeding a tradition, not for the 
sake of its venerable character, but because it stems 
from past situations which may arise again. " 2 
Speaking again of the positive role of traditional 
values, he notes that in stable social groups the actions 
and behavior of the members are shaped by definite group 
traditions, inhibitions and ethical standards, which are 
a prerequisite for tolerable human life. 
Nobody can expect a human being to live in complete 
uncertainty and with unlimited choice. Neither the 
human body nor the human mind can bear endless 
p. 82. 
l.Mannheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 125. 
2Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
variety. There must be a sphere where basic con-
formity and continuity prevail.l 
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Sheer change, and the rapid expansion of culture 
leading to an inadequate assimilation of its meanings and 
its values, destroys rather than enhances the rich possi-
bilities for human life. "Both Mass Democracy and Totali-
tarianism show that this really happens; that democratiza-
tion of culture will benefit mankind only if the quality 
of culture is preserved."2 
In addition to these positive aspects of conserva-
tism and traditional values, there are also negative as-
pects. They may become obstacles to change. In the face 
of new goals, and the seeking of solutions to problems, 
these stabilizing values may thus offer resistance to 
change. These seeming "permanences" in the social and 
cultural fabric may become incongruous with the action 
required for achieving new values. 
The moral interpretation of one's own action is 
invalid, when, through the force of traditional 
modes of thought and conception of life, it does 
not allow for the accommodation of action and 
thought to a new and changed situation and in the 
end actually obscures and orevents this adjustment 
and transformation of man. '3 
~annheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 25. 
2Ibid., p. 45. 
~nnheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 95. 
75 
Mannheim's entire study of "ideology" constitutes 
a massive array of evidence concerning the negative value 
of "ideology." While he claims that the word "ideology" 
is essentially "non-valuational," his study of ideologies 
reveals that a particular ideology can degenerate to the 
point where its function "is to conceal the actual meaning 
of conduct rather than to reveal it."1 It is to this ex-
tent negative, because it blindly perpetuates an outmoded 
and antiquated system of values, and inhibits the coming 
of "newer and more genuine values."2 
Just as the stabilizing and seemingly permanent 
values of experience may be positive or negative, so also 
there are both positive and negative aspects to change. 
While ideology is seen to be a maintenance social function, 
utopia is seen by Mannheim to be functionally related to 
change. 
For in human mentality it is not always the same 
forces, substances, or images which can take on a 
utopian function, i.e. the function of bursting the 
bonds of the existing order. We will see in what 
follows that the utopian element in our conscious-
ness is subject to changes in content and form. 
The situation that exists at any given moment is 
constantly being shattered by different situation-
ally transcendent factors.3 
1rbid., p. 95. 
3!E.!£.' p. 206. 
2Ibid. 
-
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Utopian values and utopian elements thus have a 
positive role to play in the transformation of social 
life, and in the movement toward greater justice. But 
these same utopian elements, if combined with revolution-
ary strategy rather than reform, become negative and 
destructive of the very values they are trying to achieve. 
"If a new system starts with the destruction of the older 
leading groups in society, it destroys all the traditional 
values of European culture as well."1 Revolution also 
brings with it discontinuity and disruption between suc-
cessive elites, in whom is embodied the pervading cul-
tural values and norms. Such discontinuity, resulting 
from rapid change, obstructs the flow of values and rup-
tures the value systems which provide coherence and unity 
to a given culture. 2 
Given these various aspects of permanence and 
change in the social process, how is one to understand 
the dynamics of change? Where is the real locus of change, 
and who or what is responsible for the transformation of 
values, attitudes, goal-orientations, and intentions? 
Mannheim observes that the dynamics of change may in 
p. 84. 
~nheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 6. 
2Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
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certain instances "take an antithetic course and invert a 
given trend."1 But he believes that change through op-
posites is by no means a universal feature of history, and 
he claims that the Marxist view of the inevitable process 
of structural inversions is not at all adequate. "The 
thesis that capitalism is the dialectical opposite of 
feudalism is as questionable as the corresponding prognosis 
that the trend of capitalism points towards its anti-
thesis."2 Mannheim is willing to accept the hypothesis of 
the class struggle, not as a dogmatic necessity, but as a 
tendency, in order to be better able to understand the 
great upheavals and structural changes in society. But, he 
insists upon looking for a more comprehensive hypothesis, 
and an "elastic way of thinking which is always ready to 
adapt the hypothesis to the new realities." 3 
Mannheim's basic approach to an understanding of 
social transformation and valuational changes is to be 
found in his study of "The Problem of Generations. n 4 The 
clue to the historical character of thought processes and 
1rbid.' p. 58. 2Ibid. 
-
3Mannheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 146. 
4Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
pp. 276-320. 
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valuation, Mannheim claims, is "evidenced not only by the 
individual consciousness, as it appears from within, 
phenomenologically as it were, but also by the fact that 
men cogitate as members of groups and not as solitary 
beings."1 'The thought of individuals is "historically 
relevant," he claims, only to the extent that the groups 
~ which they belong continue through time. Differing 
values occur in different social strata, although there is 
a comnon field of "germinal" values in which all strata 
may share. Different social strata produce variations in 
values insofar as they are positionally situated in the 
social process and are able to "project new directions of 
intentionality," to envision new goals, and to seek new 
resolve of the "vital tension which accompanies all life." 
'They are not "manufactured," they are "produced" as new 
generations emerge within the evolutionary unfolding of 
the life processes, and as "developing social reality 
introduces something incalculable, creatively new into 
the intellectual process."2 
How much of the "creatively new" which Mannheim re-
fers to is dependent upon the individual, and how much 
~nheim, 
p. 83. 
Essais on the Sociology of Culture, 
~annheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 188. 
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upon the social process? He has already acknowledged that 
it is both. But in discussing novelty as it appears in 
the evolution of a new "generation style," he declares 
that such novelty "depends entirely on the trigger action 
of the social and cultural process," perhaps operating 
predominantly "through the agency of the economic or of 
one or the other 'ideological' spheres."1 Change and 
novelty thus appear to be characteristic primarily of suc-
cessively emerging generations, observed as trends or cur-
rents of goal-actualization within the social process. 
Genuine entelechies are primarily displayed by the 
social and intellectual trends or currents of which 
we spoke above. Each of these trends or currents (which may well be explained in terms of the social 
structure) evolves certain basic attitudes which 
exist over and above the change of generations as 
enduring (though nevertheless constantly changing) 
formative.principles underlying social and histor-
ical development. Successively emerging new ~en­
erations, then, superimpose their own generat1on 
entelechies upon the more comprehensive stable 
entelechies of the various polar trends; this is 
how entelechies of the liberal, conservative, or 
socialist trends come to be transformed from gen-
eration to generation.2 
Change is thus seen to be of a more microscopic 
nature, rather than a cataclysmic series of cultural or 
valuational ruptures, or isolated disturbances. Even in 
so-called revolutionary periods "the old and the new are 
1 Ibid., p. 310. 2Ibid., p. 314. 
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blended."1 Change is not to be thought of in tenns of 
absolute synthesis, but rather one must see the construc-
tive values and emerging goals even in "trivial micro-
scopic processes."2 
It is not clear just how open-ended this process 
of social transformation is, so far as Mannheim is con-
cerned, or, on the other hand, to what extent the social 
forces and historical processes are beyond the control of 
individual persons. He asserts on the one hand that "a 
democratizing trend is our predestined fate," in politics 
as well as in intellectual and cultural life as a whole. 
''Whether we like it or not," he writes, "the trend is 
irreversible, and hence it is the supreme duty of the 
political thinker to explore its potentialities and im-
plications.1 On the other hand, he argues for the "re-
education of the whole man" toward a "conscious apprecia-
tion of values that appeal to reason."2 
In a society where the value controls were traffic 
lights directly appealing either to conditioned 
responses or to the emotions and the unconscious 
mind, one could bring about social action without 
strengthening the intellectual powers of the ego. 
But in a society in which the main changes are to 
p. 171 
~nheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
~nheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, P. 23. 
be brought about through collective deliberation, 
and in Which re-valuations should be based ulon 
intellectual insight and consent, a-complete y new 
system of education would be necessary, one which 
would focus its main energies on the development 
of our intellectual powers and bring about a frame 
of mind which can bear the burden of scepticism 
and which does not panic when many of the thought 
habits are doomed to vanish.l [Italics mine.] 
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Here Mannheim has introduced the principle of ra-
tional control. "Collective deliberation," as well as 
"intellectual insight and consent" presuppose the principle 
of rational coherence as the condition which makes these 
possible. While the general drift of the social processes 
may be in the direction of an "irreversible" and pre-
destined "democratizing trend," techniques of control 
based upon rational values are the clue to determining the 
continuing directions in which the modern society can 
develop. 2 Mannheim cannot mean "irreversible" in an ab-
solute sense, otherwise his insistence upon rational value 
controls over the social process are meaningless. Basically, 
he is confident of human rationality and its capacity to 
guide the social processes toward the goals it has set for 
itself. But both value systems and social techniques are 
necessary for rationally guided social change. In discuss-
ing, for example, the problem of reorganizing the 
1Ibid. 
-
2 Ibid., p. 2. 
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institutions surrounding the meaning of property, he points 
out that both values and social technique are necessary. 
It is not enough to give a conscious reinterpretation 
of the value system organized around the idea of 
property; a complete reform is needed if the original 
intention, that the value of social justict should 
prevail, is to be put into practice again. 
What is the basis of change in social life? Not just 
value systems, not just conscious reinterpretation of 
value systems, not just the norms of social justice, but 
all of these combined with the will to re-direct, through 
rationally determined social techniques, the institutions 
and cultural patterns of society--this is the ultimate 
basis of social transformation. At the bottom of 
Manriheim's social theory is a voluntaristic emphasis that 
ultimately calls for the active penetration of reality by 
the participating historical subject. 
4. Value--Causality and 
Spontaneity 
Mannheim's understanding of the nature of causa-
tion and of spontaneity in the social and cultural world 
begins with the assumption of the possibility of discover-
ing general trends and predictable series of events more 
or less analogous to those found in the physical world. 
But his understanding of this causal relatedness is far 
different from that involved in traditional mechanistic 
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or behavioristic theories. He is convinced that a hypo-
thetical interpretation of causal relatedness "only serves 
its proper purpose as long as it is able to order facts in 
a certain limited field of experience without distorting 
their inner nature."1 Theories of causality must not be 
generalized, he states, even by sociologists, and he 
points to the Marxian system as an over-extension of the 
causal hypothesis. Causality, moreover, may have varying 
aspects within different epochs, and with different vari-
ables, economic or otherwise. 
In certain epochs the onward course of events, the 
sequence of cause and effect, may fit in with the 
scheme, because the mainsprings of the age are 
technical and economic. But there can be other 
epochs in which vital changes with powerful reper-
cussions arise in spheres other than that of eco-
nomic technique, or spring from violent shocks to 
human consciousness.Z 
Mannheim thus bars the way to a strictly natural-
istic or deterministic explanation of human valuations 
and social phenomena, and he refuses to study man and so-
ciety as if they were nothing but parts of external nature. 
~annheim, Man and Society in an Age of Recons truc-
!!Qn, p. 18. 
2Ibid. 
-
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His basic point of departure is avowedly that of Hegel, 
namely, "his collectivistic, and potentially sociological, 
understanding of ideas." 
It was Hegel who set the pattern for the structural 
view, and it was he who sensitized later German so-
ciologists and humanists to the total context of 
historical things . • • The spurious dichotomy of 
the immanent evolution versus the social history of 
ideas was the upshot of a split in the ranks of 
Hegel's successorf. Such a dichotomy was alien to 
Hegel's thinking. 
Mannheim differentiates his meaning of the word 
causality from a type of genetic, historical, causal 
explanation. As against this attempted "explanation" of 
moral and cultural phenomena, he proposes to call his own 
approach that of "interpretation" (Deutung), the analysis 
of the inner meaning of events. This inner meaning of 
events is further to be understood against a larger "frame 
of reference--that of Weltanschauung."2 Weltanschauung, 
as Mannheim uses the term, involves a valuational as well 
as a contentual or factual character. It is impossible, 
Mannheim states, to construct a theory of Weltanschauung 
by explaining one merely as the causal product of the 
other, but "solely by showing both to be parts of the same 
p. 59. 
~annheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
p. 80. 
~eim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
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totality: by disengaging, step by step, the common docu-
mentary import contained in both."1 
In terms of the specific problem of values and the 
present disruption of value systems, Mannheim sees a mul-
tiple series of social conditions and a complex set of cir-
cumstances which lie behind the outward problem, and which 
must ultimately be understood before the problems in valu-
ation can be resolved. But he is impatient with any at-
tempts which oversimplify the problem or which ignore 
these complex conditions. 
According to the Marxist, you have only to put your 
economic house in order and the present chaos in 
valuation will disappear. In my view, no remedy of 
the chaos is possible without a sound economic order, 
but this is by no means enough, as there are a great 
many other social conditions which influence the 
process of value creation and dissemination, each of 
which has to be considered on its own merits.2 
In Mannheim's view, any discussion of spontaneity 
or novelty or uniqueness in the area of human valuations 
and goal-orientations must take place against a total 
background of structural pre-conditions. Whether it be 
the uniqueness of the individual personality and its value 
system, or emerging institutional norms, or the moral 
norms of a community, this newness or uniqueness does not 
1 Ibid., p. 81. 
~annheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 16 • 
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emerge from a vacuum, but is rooted in and conditioned by 
a complex existential base. 
Mannheim states that "the unfolding of reason, the 
ordering of impulses and the form taken by morality, are 
by no means an accident, nor do they involve primarily only 
single individuals and the characteristics they happen to 
have. nl These emerging forms of morality and social im-
pulse "depend on the problems set by the existing order 
of society." Emergence of "new human beings" always oc-
curs within the context of "accumulated cultural possessions;" 
a context which alone makes "fresh selection" possible. 
This continuous emergence of new individuals and new "gen-
erations" is actually what "facilitates re-evaluation of 
our [cultural] inventory and teaches us both to forget that 
which is no longer useful and to covet that which has yet 
to be won. " 2 
The category of innovation is as basic to the 
social ontology of the mind as is tradition and its 
disruption. How do new things break through the 
"cake of custom"? The familiar reference to the 
genius is not sufficient. To repeat, one need not 
ignore the role of leading individuals to consider 
the psychology of the pioneer secondary to the so-
ciological question of what situations provoke new 
collective expectations and individual discoveries. 
~nheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
.tl2!1, p. 43. 
~annheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 294. 
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The answer is almost implied in the question: innova-
tions arise either from a shift in a collective situ-
ation or from a changing relationship between groups 
or between individuals and their groups. It is such 
shifts which father new adaptations, new assimilative 
efforts, and new creations.! 
Mannheim observes that the "craving for social 
awareness" and the new norms of social justice which are 
arising in English society, have not arisen by sheer chance. 
The fact that persons are questioning the norms of social 
organization, and are seeking new value orientations in 
regard to man's social destiny, is "hardly mere curiosity." 
This awakening of man's consciousness, Mannheim states, is 
occurring "exactly at a juncture when this transformation 
is taking place in reality."2 In short, he sees a conjunc-
tion between man's process of re-valuation and the social, 
political, and economic sub-stranmof human existence. 
This substrab.Jn is not merely a deterministic element, but 
also a "releasing factor" as well. 
In the evolutionary idea, although unfolding still 
rests upon the inherent growth of personality, en-
vironment comes more into its own since it acts at 
least as a releasing factor. Certain potential-
ities cannot be realized without certain environ-
mental stimuli.3 
p. 84. 
1Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
~annheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 72. 
~annheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 262. 
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Innovations in valuation, value systems, goal-
orientation take place as part and parcel of the complex 
phenomena of mental processes, which include the basic so-
ciological categories of "continuity, discontinuance, re-
gression, the stereotyping process," as well as the all-
important category of "the historical dynamics of thought." 
Since these categories are conceived as "interdependent 
parts of the same social process," Mannheim prefers to 
speak of "dynamic change" rather than of "mutation. ul 
Mannheim goes yet a step beyond the deterministic 
and releasing character of these existential pre-conditions. 
While cultural values, morality, art, religion, and so 
forth, are shaped in part by social relations and the 
structural conditions of existence, it seems that these 
social factors possess a "creative energy" of their own. 
They are, in fact, more than mere structural conditions, 
passively influencing human life, but have an actualizing 
power of their own. 
Perhaps it would also be fruitful to ask ourselves 
whether society in fact can produce nothing more 
than "influences" and "relationships," or whether, 
on the contrary, social factors also possess a 
certain creative energy, a formative power, a so-
cial entelechy of their own. Is it not perhaps 
possible that this energy, arising from the interplay 
p. 85. 
~nheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
of social forces constitutes the link between the 
other entelechies of art, style, generation, etc., 
which would otherwise only accidentally cross 
paths or come together?l 
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With this view of Mannheim's dynamic social ontol-
ogy, where is the basis of individuality? Spontaneity and 
individuality are by no means to be equated. Spontaneity 
exists at all levels of existence, individual and social 
as well as the varying levels of the existential substrata. 
An understanding of individuality, Mannheim states, cannot 
be had simply by the method of "generalizing abstraction," 
by merely "juxtaposing different types" to arrive at a 
"set of general repeatedly encountered properties." Having 
done all this, one "has still not penetrated to the most 
essential core, to the unique individuality."2 
If, however, one has experienced the fUndamental 
feeling--a feeling first made articulate by romantic 
thought--that contained in every psych~intellectual­
historical phenomenon there is something absolutely 
unique, a creative principle whereby the historical 
individual is more than a peculiar combination of 
general properties, then one may risk the paradoxical 
undertaking of reducing this very uniqueness to a 
theory. This could hardly be achieved by using a 
generalizing typology (since such a theory considers 
on principle nothing but the general); hence the 
only remaining possibility consists in accounting 
for the temporal uniqueness of the phenomenon ~rom 
its own position within a historical sequence. 
1Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 285. 
2 Ibid., p. 118. 
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Mannheim attempts, in this way, to bring "the whole 
depth of the problems of dialectic" into view, and to ap-
prehend the uniqueness of "dynamic totalities" from within. 
These dynamic totalities may be comprehended as parts of a 
total "historical movement toward a spontaneously evolved 
concrete value irradiating the body of history concerned, 
toward a meaningful goal."1 The individual, the historical 
subject, can reflect upon the meaning of his position within 
the total temporal sequence, can (within limits) differen-
tiate himself from that process, and can finally, become a 
specific and unique spark of that "spontaneously evolved 
concrete value" irradiating the historical process. 2 
In short, Mannheim states that human beings and 
their values and meanings, are both determinate and self-
determining. To be self-caused means also to be involved 
in a complex system of determinate causal sequences. 
Mannheim's dynamic ontology posits levels of creativity 
and spontaneity not only at the individual and the social-
historical, but at all levels of the substrata underlying 
human existence. Individuality involves a dimension dif-
ferent from other objects in nature, namely motivation. 
That is to say, human beings are self-caused, hence, able 
to reflect upon and to participate in a spontaneously 
1Ibid. 
-
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evolving "concrete value" inunanent in the historical 
process. 
Certain problems are raised at this point, however, 
in regard to the questions of human freedom and responsi-
bility. What specific factors delimit the range of dis-
cretion or choice? For example, if value is ultimately 
rooted in action (that is, in participation in the social 
process) and is contingent upon the social-historical con-
text, how does the individual determine the relevant con-
text for his own goal-actions or values? What levels of 
consciousness are available to the individual historical 
subject, in exercising his creativity and freedom? When 
Mannheim occasionally introduces an illustration of causal 
relatedness with the oft-repeated phrase "It is never an 
accident that .•. " how firm or how open-ended does he 
intend this causal connection to be? 1 This phrase illus-
trates the sort of ambiguity that is typical of Mannheim's 
discussions on causal relations. He apparently tries to 
resolve the question by simply declaring that "at one 
moment man has the upper hand, and at another human under-
standing bows to the actual social situation."2 
1For examples of this usage, see Mannheim, Ideology 
and Uto,ia, especially the discussions on page 248 and 
page 12 . 
2Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
~' p. 151. 
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5. Value--Egoism and Communitarianism 
While the preceding categories were of a broader and 
more general nature, dealing with the widest possible con-
text of human value experience, the present polar categories 
of egoism and communitarianism provide a transition to a 
more specific locus of the value experience in terms of the 
personal and inter-personal conditions involved. The term 
egoism is not used in any narrow psychologically sectarian 
sense, but only to identify the pole of self-reference, 
self-consciousness, self-interest, the locus of individua-
tion. Communitarianism, similarly, refers to the pole of 
sociality, group-centeredness, inter-personal involvement. 
Mannheim clearly sets forth a theory of organic 
interdependence. Self-consciousness of persons includes 
judgments and valuations which have both a self-reference 
and a reference to other persons. A self-centered person 
is one who is "less able to see things and relations from 
someone else's viewpoint." By "socialization," on the 
other hand, Mannheim understands a process of the "expan-
sion of the self" in which values and judgments are made 
with reference to other selves. 1 
1Mannheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 73. 
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Actually, Mannheim's point of departure is even 
more fundamental than this. His view of the personal and 
interpersonal is rooted in the thought of Buber and Hegel. 
His point of departure is Buber's "!-Thou" as the funda-
mental reality behind the more outward social phenomena, 
and underlying the actual processes of individuation. 1 
Experience of "community" and of "persons" is increasingly 
stifled by social development, and because of their scarcity 
and our dread of their disappearance, we tend to romanticize 
them and embellish their memory. Our very "ideological 
beatification" of such experiences indicates a "certain 
loss of reality."2 
To be a "person" is to be related to other persons 
at this deep level, according to Mannheim, and what Hegel's 
Geist implies is that the role of the person is structured 
by a collective framework in which individual goals, values, 
and actions take on meaning. 3 
Our previous insistence that the individual is the 
primary locus of reality need not make us forget the 
fact that human relations, however complex, are also 
1Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 298. 
2Ibid. 
-
p. 68. 
~annheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
real. (To be sure, the group does not absorb the 
individual and the person does not completely as-
similate and reflect his society, but there are 
common areas in which the actions of the individual 
become socially and historically relevant and, con-
versely, group structures become the primary1de-terminants of the actions of single persons~ 
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What is important, Mannheim believes, both in Hegel 
and in his own sociological approach, is that it puts an 
ent to the "fiction of the detachment of the individual 
from the group," this interpersonalism providing the ma-
trix within which the individual person thinks, and acts, 
and values. 2 This organically interdependent view of per-
sons and community Mannheim sometimes refers to as "demo-
cratic personalism." 3 This ideal of democratic personal-
ism always involves a dual direction, whether it is applied 
to educational efforts or to any other facets of human 
life and social organization. It fosters both socialization 
and individualization. Socialization should never proceed 
so far as to stifle individualization, and individualiza-
tion should never proceed to the point of producing social 
chaos and anarchy. 4 "There must arise a general sense of 
1~. 
2Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 28. 
3Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 244. 
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interdependence--of the interdependence which binds the 
single experience to the stream of single individuals and 
these in turn to the fabric of the wider community of ex-
perience and activity."1 
Mannheim, like Marx and Hegel before him, was very 
much concerned with the problem of alienation. He proposes 
that in his approach, i.e., in his analysis of the cogni-
tive and valuational processes, a "new sort of life-
orientation is at work, seeking to stay the alienation 
and disorganization which arose out of the exaggeration of 
the individualistic and mechanistic attitude." 2 In the 
historical legacy of economic liberalism, massive competing 
units confound the individual and in the midst of the be-
wildering complexity of institutional structures "the 
individual no longer sees his way to meaningful contribu-
tions to the common end." 3 In the midst of chaos and 
disintegration of behavior, both flight from responsibility 
and deep doubt of former values prevail. Whole groups of 
persons within society may find themselves cast-offs from 
1Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 32. 
2 !!?.!.5!·' p. 33. 
3Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 177. 
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that society, either because they are too old, or too young, 
or too middle aged. Young persons may find themselves 
emancipated from family life, but without finding an al-
ternate role of responsibility within the pattern of soci-
ety. Social mobility and massive economic dislocations may 
be causes for whole groups "dropping out of the social 
structure."1 All of these forces of disintegration and 
alienation can only be combatted by the practical applica-
tion of the ideal of democratic personalism to specific 
problems in social organization, restoring persons once 
again to the social fabric and reintegrating them in an 
organic manner. Democratization is the only basis on 
which persons are no longer compelled to meet other per-
sons solely in their role, either as social superior or 
inferior, but can in fact "establish pure existential con-
tact" with them as human beings. "This form of relation-
ship between the 'I' and the 'thou' can become a general 
pattern only on the basis of democratization." 2 
Mannheim refuses to treat the issue as one between 
the "great personality" and the "mass," but develops a 
viewpoint which seeks from the beginning to interpret 
p. 242. 
2Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
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individual valuations and goal-seeking activity in all 
spheres within the context of group experience. 1 The pro-
cess of valuation is not simply the free-wheeling motiva-
tion of the outstanding individual, nor is it merely the 
leveled-out mass of humanity. The process of valuation is 
to be seen as a "coherent system of social and psycholog-
ical activities," among which are value creation, value 
dissemination, value reconciliation, value standardization, 
and value assimilation. 2 There are definite social condi-
tions which favor or upset the smooth working of these 
processes. 
For the individual life-history is only a component 
in a series of mutually intertwined life-histories 
which have their common theme in this upheaval; the 
particular new motivation of a single individual 
is a part of a motivational complex in which many 
persons participate in various ways.3 
Conscious acknowledgment of this mutuality and solidarity 
provides the basis of community, and the common life and 
common values are "crystallized and elaborated into an 
ethical code," remolding and reshaping the values and 
attitudes of various persons who come within the range of 
1Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 30. 
2Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 17. 
3Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 27-28. 
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this social grouping. 1 No society can be built, Mannheim 
contends, without some substratum of conformity. "Indi-
vidualization is only sound where it reflects differenti-
ations or variations from a communal norm and is not 
built on air." 2 Only through such a communitarian under-
standing of society, Mannheim believes, can men once 
again discover values which eluded them in an age of un-
limited competition: "values of identification with other 
members of the community, values of collective responsi-
bility and its consequent impositions . . • personal re-
finements of attitude." 3 
Far removed from my intention is any deliberate 
provocation to propaganda. The desideratum in my 
view is a reasoned planning in the direction of 
social techniques, so clearly a necessity of the 
time, and further that these techniques should be 
in terms of the human sciences incorporating all the 
most enlightened values in our age.4 
Once again Mannheim raises the problem of how 
these "most enlightened values in our age" are to be known, 
and by what manner they are to be judged. They certainly 
~annheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 133. 
2Karl Mannheim, "Recent Trends in the Building of 
Society," Human Affairs (London: The Macmillan Co., 1937) , 
p. 298. 
3 Ibid., p. 299. 
4 
Ibid., p. 300. 
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are differently judged, depending upon whether one is a 
member of communist, capitalist, or socialist society, or 
of varying religious background and orientation, or de-
pending upon any of numerous patterns of social differ-
entiation. Mannheim is certainly aware of these varying 
patterns of perspectival differentiation, as he appears 
to be aware of the problem of judgment in human valuations. 
He speaks of the "riddle of changing human valuations," 
and proposes eight hypotheses which he believes will help 
to solve this "riddle."1 
The first hypothesis is that valuations are origin-
ally set by groups, i.e., "the real carrier of standards 
is not the individual, but the group of which he happens 
to be the exponent." Second, the valuational standards 
of varying groups reflect to a large extent their re-
spective social structures; e.g., the values of a warrior 
group as different from the values of agriculturalists, 
etc. Third, valuation is not an isolated psychological 
act, but is inherently social and serves an integrating 
function in the life of the group. Fourth, conflicting 
valuations occur when groups are "co-ordinated or super-
imposed" on one another, posing "counter-values" set up 
1Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 236. 
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against one another; e.g., when values of the warrior 
caste are set against the tribal rules of conformity. 
Fifth, social differentiation and stratification involve 
different value systems, which either become separated and 
insulated, or else clash or mix, "depending on the nature 
of the social integration." Sixth, in static societies 
value systems become fixed by elites, who then subjugate 
other strata of society and the values they represent. 
Seventh, in dynamic societies differentiated groups in so-
ciety can challenge the values and prestige of the dominant 
elite. Eighth, the value-generating function is not con-
fined to social groups only, but to broader "social forces 
and social processes which determine and change the group-
forms themselves. nl 
The above hypothesesare helpful in interpreting 
the dynamics of changing valuations, in demonstrating that 
valuations do undergo certain shifts under certain kinds 
of circumstance. These hypotheses point out the basis of 
conflict as a function of differentiated social groups and 
their respective value systems. They do offer a functional 
analysis of society as it is, and as it may be observed 
sociologically. They do not offer an answer to the ques-
tion of what are "the most enlightened values in our age." 
1 Ibid., pp. 236-68. 
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They do not suggest any clue to the nature of the "ought-
claim" or criterion of judgment, a fundamental factor which 
is presupposed by every one of these hypotheses. If the 
valuational norms are "originally set by groups," as 
Mannheim points out, what legitimizes these norms in the 
first place, and what criteria of judgment can be offered 
to distinguish the genuine from the spurious? If the 
"individual is the primary locus of reality," what role 
does the individual have in the process of "value creation, 
value dissemination, value reconciliation, value standard-
ization, and value assimilation"? These questions all re-
main, even with due acknowledgment of the hypotheses which 
Mannheim puts forth to help "solve the riddle of changing 
human valuations." 
6. Value and Personality 
Whereas the preceding category established Mannheim's 
view of the reciprocity of valuational processes between the 
poles of self and community, the present category will indi-
cate more specifically the nature of individual conscious-
ness, and the role of value in differentiating and individu-
ating personality. If the individual is the "primary locus 
of reality," as Mannheim states, what role does the indi-
vidual have in the creation of new values, the reconciliation 
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of conflicting values, and the judgment or-standardization 
of values? 
Mannheim approaches this question with reference 
to certain observations about the nature of the cultural 
process. New participants in that process continually 
emerge, as former participants continually disappear. Any 
such participant can engage in but a limited segment of 
that historical-cultural process, but is nevertheless a 
bearer and transmitter of the accumulated cultural heri-
tage which links generation to generation in a continuous 
process. 1 Basic to every new participant in that process 
is the fundamental question of identity. 
Different as man in various ages may be, he 
posits similar questions about himself: he wants to 
know how to think of himself in order to act. Some 
conception of the world and the self, unspoken though 
it may be, accompanies every move we make. The ques-
tion, Who are we?, has always been asked, but it is 
always through the medium of different objects that 
such questions are faced.2 
Again, Mannheim insists that a man can become a 
"person" for himself only to the extent that he is a 
"person" for others and others are "persons" for him. 3 
"In the light of this approach," Mannheim points out, 
p. 92. 
1Mannheim, Essays on the S•ciology of Culture, 
2Ibid. 
-
3 Ibid. , p. 244. 
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"no one is either too humble or too poor for his soul not 
to have had its own experiences and triumphs which are 
even more important than great empires."1 Self-valuation 
is, for Mannheim, the starting point of individuation. The 
collapse of medieval civilization took with it a meaningful 
frame of reference, a center to which one could relate ex-
periences and a meaningful destiny for the soul of the 
individual person. A new ultimate source of values had 
to be discovered, and this new source of values was the 
concept of an "internal life and internal life history."2 
All differentiated values and goals and meanings of this 
"internal life history" are built upon the fundamental ex-
perience of self-worth and self-esteem, the experience of 
valuing one's self as a "person." 3 
Self-consciousness arises, not from mere self-
contemplation, but through the individual's struggles 
with the world, in actual confrontation with real problems. 4 
The "impulse to act" makes the objects of the world acces-
sible to the emerging consciousness of the acting subject. 
~annheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 292. 
2tbid., p. 293. 3tbid., p. 297. 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 169. 
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In this confrontation of the person with the world, goals 
are set and must be approached "through a concatenation 
of intervening ends." In this differentiation and diversi-
fication of goals, and selectivity of values, the individ-
ual is continually involved in a "multipolar situation."1 
He is involved in an economic role, a familial role, and 
any number of other social and institutional roles, each 
representing certain complexes of value. In a relatively 
simple society, the process of individuation and selectiv-
ity of values is less complicated, for individuation is 
derived from fewer roles. In a complex society, the 
multiplicity of roles may tend toward a conflict of com-
peting roles. 2 Within this context, individuation of 
personality is "that kind of organization of the mind, 
specific to each individual, by which, through his mutual 
interaction with the environment, he develops a pattern 
of inner organization which is unique in itself."3 By 
"environment" Mannheim means not only external factors, 
and social and economic organization, but also the highly 
p. 45. 
1Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
2Ibid. 
-
~annheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 278. 
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important symbolic environment of language, meaning, norms, 
beliefs, and values. 
Individuated personality arises as the individual 
person appropriates and internalizes the meanings and val-
ues and goals of the groups with which he interacts, thus 
creating a dynamic pattern which is both unique in its 
total configuration, and yet is a bearer of a "basic in-
ventory of group life" whose values and norms are rooted 
in the social process. 1 The process of growing self-
consciousness and self-valuation includes the responsibil-
ity for accepting, refusing, or integrating, these values 
and goals of the groups with which he interacts. 2 
Values, for Mannheim, constitute the basis of 
identity and the basis of personality; conflict of values, 
likewise, constitutes the basis of disintegration and loss 
of identity. The individual person is oriented to the 
world through a dynamic structure of values, and a ruptur-
ing or dislocation of this basic value structure results 
in disorientation of the individual. 
Although we may know a great deal about the conditions 
under which conflicts arise, we may still know nothing 
1Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 299. 
2Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 304. 
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about the inner situation of living human beings, 
and how, when their values are shattered, they lose 
their bearings and strive again to find themselves. 
Just as the most exact theory of cause and function 
does not answer the question as to who I actually 
am, what I actually am, or what it means to be a 
human being, so there can never arise out of it that 
interpretation of one's self and the world demanded 
by even the simplest action based on some evaluative 
decision.l 
Mannheim also makes frequent mention of the neces-
sity for "privacy" and "inwardness," by which he under-
stands the desire of a person to "withdraw certain inner 
experiences from the control of the outer world and to 
claim them for himself." 2 Privacy and inwardness, he con-
tends, are the strongest factors in individuation and 
growth of an independent personality. "It is in this realm 
of seclusion and partial isolation that our experiences 
gain in depth and that we become spiritually different 
from our fellow-men." 3 The right to introversion and 
privacy is, moreover, one of the strongest guarantees of 
a reorganization of society, provided the spheres of in-
ternalization are not completely cut off from the social 
order. 4 England, he notes, is a country in which the 
1Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 19. 
~annheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 157. 
3Ibid. 
~annheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 299. 
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"cult of privacy" was most fully developed, solitude being 
a virtue that was rooted in the Protestant principle of 
immediate relationship between man and God. 1 Speaking 
specifically of values, Mannheim defines privacy as the 
"withdrawal of a set of values from public control. " 2 This 
withdrawal enables the "inner core of the secluded self" to 
differentiate itself and frequently to "set itself against 
the public norm and the stereotypes" which operate in so-
ciety. Privacy has a productive significance for culture 
only if it represents a partial and not absolute withdrawal 
of values. Being one of the primary factors of individuali-
zation, privacy must thus be guaranteed by the conditions 
of social organization. Collectivism in extreme forms 
denies, or at least thwarts, this need for privacy. Ra-
tionally organized society, on the other hand, seeing the 
profound value of privacy, can and should structure society 
so that spheres of privacy are not only possible, but are 
nurtured as the basis of a creative and stable community of 
persons. 3 
~annheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 158. 
~annheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 298. 
~nnheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 63. 
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Anxiety, a mass phenomenon in contemporary man, re-
sults from the fact that man embodies within himself and 
his value system the most heterogeneous and contradictory 
influences. To this is added the fact that there is no 
technique for mediation between these antagonistic valuations, 
nor is there time for real assimilation. 1 Basic necessary 
processes of value assimilation and selection are overrun by 
social mechanisms and impersonal social forces. Man finds 
himself living in a "shapeless society," forced to choose 
between various patterns of action and valuations without 
proper sanction. 2 The result is anxiety, occurring not 
merely on the level of his outward behavior but at the 
deepest levels of the self, in the "inward revaluation of 
himself." 3 In short, alienation at the social pole equals 
anxiety at the personal pole. 
In his basic understanding of the process of indi-
viduation, Mannheim distinguishes four different aspects. 
First, individuation begins with self-valuation, which 
proceeds through a process of new and changing attitudes 
1Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 20. 
~annheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 309. 
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of self-regard, or self-valuation. Second, individuation 
involves differentiation, the distinguishing of one's self 
from other selves, or internalization. Third, individua-
tion proceeds through goal-determination and acceptance or 
rejection of social patterns and group value-orientations. 
Fourth, it involves what Mannheim refers to as a "deepen-
ing into ourselves, that is a kind of introversion, which 
implies receiving into our experience of ourselves and 
sublimating the individualising forces around and within 
US • ul 
Self-valuation, i.e., perceiving one's self as an 
"I" and experiencing one's self as "value," is fundamental 
to these further processes of individuation and differ-
entiation. Anxiety, resulting from the shattering of 
varying levels of self-valuation, and the internalization 
of antagonistic values, is the basic problem of modern 
man. It is the business of a responsible and intentional 
connnunity to help "manage" values, by providing the con-
ditions within which persons can participate in the pro-
cess of value creation, value dissemination, value recon-
ciliation, and value assimilation. 
1Mannheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 66. 
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7. Value and the Ought 
Having examined Mannheim's basic conception of 
personality and individuation, it is necessary to deal in 
a more specific way with how he understands the nature of 
the ought-claim in human experience. He objects that 
Kant's formalistic ethics, which is historically "nothing 
more.than an elaboration of the Protestant idea that 
conscience is the essential thing in action," places an 
exclusive emphasis upon intention and corresponds only to 
a social order in which it is hardly possible to foresee 
the concrete patterns of right action. 1 This sort of 
idealism tends to make of conscience a purely personal 
affair. For Mannheim, the development of conscience is 
not exclusively a personal matter, but is "bound up with 
a continual give-and-take, a joining with others for the 
purpose of common discovery of fresh fields of activity 
for which new norms must be found by common effort." 2 
Consistent with his general view of personality, 
the conscience of the individual has its roots in the 
continually emerging conscience of the community. He 
1Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 111. 
~annheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 214. 
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acknowledges that his views in this regard are very simi-
lar to those of T. H. Green, that the "terminus ~ guo 
forms a common experience, and the terminus ad ~' the 
aim at which we tend to arrive, is also embedded in a com-
mon field of expectations and possibilities."1 A changing 
community cannot satisfy the requirements of its ongoing-
ness by a set of inflexible commands, but rather by a 
continual search for new norms which can express these 
changing experiences. Persons involved in that changing 
experience likewise must shape the content of conscience 
in a new and relevant way. 
For Mannheim, the educated conscience is more than 
super-ego or ego-ideal, although both of these dimensions 
of personality are important parts of the total picture. 
Mannheim's view seeks the creation of a conscience in 
which "the system of principles which will be considered 
as the roles of conduct, the hierarchy of values by which 
we want to be guided, is subject to our conscious criti-
cism."2 The need for an ego-ideal is a part of this, with 
its value-patterns to serve as a model or goal of person-
ality. The super-ego, far from being merely an inhibitive 
1rbid., p. 215. 
2Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 275. 
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force preventing a-social behavior, is a constructive power 
that is capable of creating a whole system of values in 
elaboration of the ego-ideal. Conscience, in Mannheim's 
terms, embraces both of these, and functions to attain "an 
individual responsible ego which is both able to discern 
good from bad, healthy from unhealthy influences, and to 
revise the values of its environment, and gradually to 
transform its behaviour appropriately."1 
The future presents itself to us, Mannheim notes, 
only in the form of possibility, as it comes into conjunc-
tion with the now, the present moment in which we must 
choose. It is the imperative of the "ought" that tells 
us which of the possibilities we should choose, and what 
directionality should be given to momentary acts and de-
cisions. Knowledge of that future is not possible in any 
absolute sense, for it appears in experience as a more or 
less "impenetrable medilUI1." 2 At this point, man needs a 
moral imperative, a utopia, to drive him onward and to give 
him a meaningful relationship to history, guided by goals, 
values, and purposeful striving. But such a utopia, or 
complex value structure providing the guidelines of his 
strivings, must not be unrelated to the social context in 
1Ibid. 
-
2Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia,pp. 260-61. 
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which man finds himself. Mannheim proposes what might be 
termed a functional idealism, as regards the relation be-
tween values and social context. Quoting and concurring 
with s. C. Pepper, Mannheim writes: 
Whilst societies co-operate in the service of certain 
purposes, "those purposes are nothing other than 
ideals . • • ideals that actually function in moral-
ity. But for an ideal to function in morality, it 
must be more than a mere ideal. There must be co-
operation of individuals about it, and that co-
operation must be in some degree crystallised into 
a social structure. It is the action of the social 
structure that makes the obligation categorial. 
Until an ideal takes root in a social structure it 1 can claim nothing, but hypothetical obligation . • • 
But while the roots of conscience are in the social struc-
ture, Mannheim acknowledges that the final arbiter and 
judge of values is the individualized conscience. He 
seems to have a somewhat ambivalent view regarding the 
rationality or irrationality of different values. He con-
trasts, for example, the religious value of "loving one's 
neighbor" with the values of "democratic" or "dictatorial" 
organization. The former is fundamentally irrational, he 
claims, based simply upon the belief that this is a demand 
of God. The latter however, the values of democratic 
versus dictatorial social organization, is a "decision 
which has to be argued." Even the debate itself may 
~annheim, Systematic Sociology, p. 25. 
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presuppose some irrational value or values, he adds, but 
this does not preclude the necessity for rational deliber-
ation and the search for conscious control of values. 
Even if we agree that finally the preference might 
rest upon some irrational decision, persuasion has 
to go through the stage of conscious deliberation, 
and new techniques of conscious value appreciation 
are continually in the making.l 
What Mannheim refers to as the stage of "conscious 
deliberation" is basically the principle of rational co-
herence, as the judge and arbiter of value. It should be 
noted that Mannheim introduces the coherence principle in 
a somewhat casual manner. He occasionally uses the word 
"coherence" itself, but more frequently uses such equiva-
lent meanings as "dynamic integration" and "congruity" as 
a principle of judgment. While the coherence principle 
is a pervasive element of Mannheim's thought, he rarely 
singles it out in any calculated way. The coherence 
principle is frequently implied in his discussions of 
value and value-judgments. He mentions, for example, 
that moral and ethical responsibility dawns at the point 
where one realizes that the world of social relations is 
no longer "in the lap of fate" but is in some measure 
capable of being guided and controlled by rational judg-
ment. This rational principle, Mannheim notes in applying 
1Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 22. 
it to the ethical principle of responsibility, involves 
several factors: 
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Its chief imperatives are, first, that action should 
not only be in accord with the dictates of conscience, 
but should take into consideration the possible conse-
quences of the action in so far as they are calculable, 
and, second, which can be added on the basis of our 
previous discussion, that conscience itself should be 
subjected to critical self-examination in~der to 
eliminate all the blindly and compulsively operating 
factors.! 
While opening the way for a deliberative, debatable, 
socially-interactive view of value, where values and de-
cisions are to be "argued" on the open competitive market 
of ideas, Mannheim nevertheless has in mind a very definite 
conception of the properly educated conscience. "Our task," 
he states "is to define the ideal of democratic personality 
as the educational goal of our society."2 Further, he 
declares that "the type of conscience corresponding to the 
democratic pattern is bound to be the cotmnunal one." 3 
"Integrative behavior" is the functional ideal that is 
most relevant to the democratic personality. 4 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 191. 
~annheim, Freedom, Power 2 and Democratic Planning, p. 230. 
3 Ibid., p. 220. 
4rbid., p. 202. 
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The problem of politics and social strategy, accord-
ing to Mannheim, is to "organize human impulses in such a 
way that they will direct their energy to the right stra-
tegic points, and steer the total process of development in 
the'tiesired direction."1 The assumption here is that the 
sociologist, as sociologist, somehow knows what that de-
sired direction" is, in contrast to some psychologists and 
other behavioral scientists who try to conceive of "man in 
general" on the basis of what man is. 2 Mannheim protests 
that merely looking at what ~ is is not adequate for de-
terming what man ought to be. He does not, however, ex-
plain how sociology provides the answer to what man ought 
to be, nor how he, as a sociologist, arrived at the basic 
value presuppositions which he imposes upon his social 
theory. The bearing of his value presuppositions upon his 
sociological theory is certainly consistent with his doc-
trine of"total ideology," i.e. that every observation is 
perspectivally and valuationally conditioned, including 
his own. However, the objection at this point is that he 
leaves the impression that it is sociology which somehow 
provides him with his value assumptions, thus giving them 
1Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 199. 
2Ibid. 
117 
a sort of scientific sanction. 
Perhaps the reason for this ambiguity is the fact 
that Mannheim continually fuses the role of the social re-
searcher and strategist on the one hand, and the task of 
theoretical ethics, on the other. These areas of respon-
sibility are virtually indistinguishable in Mannheim's 
writing. This is but a logical consequence of his claim 
that sociology would replace philosophy and theology, in 
providing a justification for any normative values. At 
one point he almost reaches a distinction between the role 
of researcher-strategist and axiologist, but does not 
quite recognize it. He mentions that the sociologist 
inherits something of the humility of the religious 
mind in that [he] does not pretend to act as a cre-
ator of these forces, but rather as a strategist, 
who only watches over the factors at work in society 
in order to detect the new possibilities which are 
coming to the surface at the proper moment, and to 
reinforce thew at those points where vital decisions 
must be made .l 
But he proceeds to say that the sociologist not only ex-
amines the factors at work in society, but determines which 
goals are possible or desirable, and the means suitable for 
attaining them. In Mannheim's view, the sociologist not 
only "charts the way man has come" and examines the present 
conditions, but plots out the "horizon of expectations" 
1tbid. ' p. 190. 
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which man may now approach. 1 Value theory is here fused 
with social theory, and Mannheim thus never feels called 
upon to give a detailed accounting of his value presupposi-
tions as prolegomenon to his social theory. 
In short, for Mannheim healthy society requires 
healthy and differentiated conscience. Differentiated 
conscience, while intolerable in a totalitarian society, 
is a basic ingredient of democratic society. "It is a 
part of the democratic vision that there should be some 
people swimming against the current and part of democratic 
education that there be good swimmers among them." 2 
8. Value and the Meaning of Freedom 
Mannheim differentiates his view of freedom from 
that of nineteenth century conservatism, which regarded 
freedom as the right of each estate to live according to 
its privileges, and from the view of the romantic-
conservative and Protestant movement which regarded freedom 
as the right of each individual to live according to his 
own unique personality. He differentiates it also from 
the nineteenth century liberal equalitarian conception of 
~annheim, Freedom 2 Power 2 and Democratic Planning, 
p. 213. 
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freedom which maintained that all men have the same funda-
mental rights at their disposal. He does not deny these 
equalitarian premises, but rather takes them as his start-
ing point in the development of a socially oriented con-
cept of freedom. 1 
The ethics of the Enlightenment, Mannheim claims, 
purposely left the inner nature of freedom undefined, with 
no answer whatever to the simple question "freedom for 
what?" Freedom was only negatively defined as non-
intervention of the state in private affairs, or in terms 
of maxims which aimed at preventing encroachment on the 
freedom of others. All the important social dynamics were 
ignored, and the state or the community evaded responsibil-
ity for making important decisions. 2 
Mannheim understands by freedom "not so much free-
dom of action but the possibility of self-expression."3 
This self-expression involves a "continual give and take 
of emotion," an emotional harmony founded upon a common 
experience, the spontaneous discussion of events and mean-
ings and values. He insists that freedom is more than the 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 273. 
2Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 346. 
3 Ibid., p. 371. 
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deciding of one's own destiny and the dispo~al of one's 
own property, but encompasses as well the "influence one 
is able to exert in determining the aims which are to be 
realized by collective action."1 Freedom has meaning only 
within the context of a matrix of social and historical 
circumstances, and only if the conditions of social organ-
ization are oriented toward the democratically agreed 
goals and values of the community. But these conditions 
can prevail only if the community "has a vision of aims 
to be achieved and a knowledge of the means by which they 
can be achieved."2 
Social conditions can be rationally ordered and 
organized in such a way as to encourage the expression of 
the active self, or they may be so organized as to thwart 
or suppress thatself-expression. It is this active part 
of the self, according to Mannheim, which is "the onto-
logical foundation of freedom." 3 The idea of freedom, 
moreover, presupposes an ontological equality of all human 
beings. "The point is not that all men are equal as to 
their qualities, merits, and endowment," Mannheim writes, 
p. 190. 
1
rbid.' p. 373. 
2Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 105. 
~nheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
"but that all embody the same ontological principle Q! 
human-ness."1 
121 
To be free, then, is to be a participant in the com-
munity or connnunities where values, goals, and the "vision 
of aims to be achieved" are decided. The problem of human 
freedom is the problem of maintaining the equilibrium be-
tween the possibilities of individual choice in a given 
situation and the necessities of group control which main-
tain and protect the conditions for the exercise of that 
free choice. The concrete elements of these many possi-
bilities of choice and social restraint, provide a matrix 
within which the character of individuals is shaped, and 
from which emerge the concrete norms and values of a par-
ticular cultural group. 2 Forms of freedom can only be 
formulated in terms of a given society, and the conditions 
which exist within that particular society. Types of 
freedom and self-expression which are possible in one so-
ciety cannot be demanded from or superimposed upon another 
society, which itself may have other forms of freedom at 
its command. 3 Freedom to select or choose values, or to 
~nnheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
p. 176. 
2Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 160. 
3rbid., p. 369. 
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discriminate between competing value systems, is inextric-
ably rooted in the social matrix. Moreover, values offered 
as options to the participants of a given community must 
be relevant to the social conditions and circumstances of 
the participants in that community. 
What is the use of freedom in teaching and learning 
to a poor man who has neither the time nor the means 
to acquire the necessary education? What use is the 
freedom to choose our own philosophy of life, to 
form our own opinions, if the sociological mechanisms 
of our society create insecurity, anxiety, neuroses, 
which prevent us from making sound and rational deci-
sions?! 
Mannheim's phrase "planning for freedom" is per-
haps the best single clue to understanding his social 
strategy. This frequently used phrase does, in fact, sum 
up his whole social theory. Caught between the disintegrat-
ing effects of mass society on the one hand, and eager 
totalitarianisms on the other, a third way will seek to 
find new ways to consciously "free the genuine and spon-
taneous social controls"2 and re-shape values according to 
the new vision of democratic society. 
Planning for freedom does not mean prescribing a 
definite form which individuality must take, but 
having both the knowledge and experience to decide 
what kind of education, what kind of social groups 
and what kind of situations afford the best chance 
1 !.!?..!£.' p. 377. 
2Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 25. 
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of kindling initiativ~ the desire to form one's own 
character and decide one's own destiny.l 
Planning, in Mannheim's view, is not fundamentally a matter 
of coercion or suppression or restraint. A positive view 
of planning sees it as a releasing factor and an enabling 
condition, releasing the creative tendencies in society, 
and enabling ever wider areas of self-expression. Planning 
for freedom has a positive value only "if it controls liv-
ing forces without suppressing them." 2 
Most important of all, Mannheim believes, is that 
a society which plans for freedom provides for the dis-
covery of ~ values, which were formerly lost to mankind 
in an age of unlimited competition. To plan for freedom, 
i.e., to provide for "citadels of self-determination in a 
regulated social order," means to open the door to the 
values of community, of identification with other members 
of society, of corporate responsibility, and of the shared 
values of a common experience, as well as many other new 
1 1 f 1 . 3 Th . 1 eve s o va ue exper1ence. ere 1s, moreover, a ca -
culated risk in this sort of democratic freedom, where all 
individuals are considered as "vital centres," not merely 
in abstract principle but in fact. This "vital selfhood" 
1Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 265. 
2Ibid., p. 14. 3 !E!2.·' p. 264. 
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(Eigenlebendigkeit) is not only the creative, vitalizing 
agent of democracy, but also its greatest potential danger 
"for the life of a democratic society always skirts chaos 
owing to the free scope it gives to the vital energies of 
all individuals."1 
Freedom thus involves risk, and there is no pre-
established divine harmony that guarantees the outcomes. 
Harmony is possible, not because of any cosmic guarantee, 
but only through faith in human reason and a coordinated 
collective will. It is precisely at this point where 
Mannheim acknowledges some of the difficulties sociology 
confronts in trying to understand human freedom. Sociol-
ogy basically seeks to discover regularities of behavior 
in a particular homogenized field, but attention to these 
regularities alone leads to a mechanistic view. Whereas, 
beginning with the individual and his vital selfhood and 
the semi-autonomous initiative manifested in his actions 
and choices, Mannheim acknowledges the difficulty of soci-
ology in doing justice to this aspect of human nature. 
"Each individual is the centre of his own universe and is 
free in this sense."2 To this extent the individual is 
1Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
p. 177. 
2~.' p. 227. 
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inaccessible to sociological inquiry. 
What then can the sociology of knowledge add to an 
understanding of the problem of human freedom? Is there 
a positive role that can be taken by sociology? Mannheim 
admits that there is one question which the sociologist 
can never answer scientifically, namely: "What are the 
unique and individual paths which a given person must fol-
low to attain a rational and moral way of life?"1 Sociol-
ogy can determine which social structures and which condi-
tions will lead to self-centeredness and irresponsibility, 
and which social conditions will foster a capacity for 
responsibility and communitarian values. Sociology can 
analyze the social process and probe the social determina-
tion of ideas and values, not that men may excuse their 
behavior and absolve themselves of responsibility, but 
rather that they may refuse to let the anonymous social 
process make decisions for them, and instead assume the 
responsibility for a decision for themselves. 2 The so-
ciology of values enlarges man's responsibility rather than 
contracting it. Mannheim offers, in effect, a new socio-
logical charter of freedom: 
1Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 51. 
2Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 275. 
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The fact that the sociology of knowledge gives us a 
certain foundation does not free us from the responsi-
bility of arriving at decisions. It does, however, 
enlar~e the field of vision within the limits of which 
decis~ons must be made. Those who fear that an in-
creased knowledge of the determining factors which 
enter into the formation of their decisions will 
threaten their "freedom" may rest in peace. Actually 
it is the one who is ignorant of the significant de-
termining factors and who acts under the immediate 
pressure of determinants unknown to him who is least 
free and most thoroughly predetermined in his conduct. 
Whenever we become aware of a determinant which has 
dominated us, we remove it from the realm of uncon-
scious motivation into that of the controllable, 
calculable, and objectified. Choice and decision are 
thereby not eliminated; on the contrary, motives 
which previously dominated us become subject to our 
domination; we are more and more thrown back upon our 
true self and, whereas formerly we were the servants 
of necessity, we now find it possible to unite con-
sciously wfth forces with which we are in thorough 
agreement. 
What Mannheim seeks is a progressively more ration-
alized world, in which all the conditions of living come 
under the sovereignty of rational values. He seeks a world 
where individuals exercise a maximum amount of freedom, 
through their ever-increasing awareness of the irrational 
social factors which had heretofore circumscribed that 
freedom. To act responsibly in terms of that ever-increasing 
knowledge and to subject that action to the guidance of 
rational goals and values, is to exercise freedom. Respon-
sible exercise of freedom must always be within a community 
of interests and values and aims to be achieved. 
1Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 189-90. 
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9. Value and Religion 
In Mannheim's various discussions of religion, 
certain ambiguities continually present themselves. First, 
there is the question of Whether he regarded religious 
phenomena as primary experience, or as a sociological 
derivative from other social phenomena. To what extent 
did he take a substantive view of religion and to what ex-
tent a functional approach? To what extent did he maintain 
the extreme rationalism of his earlier "Gennan period," 
when his interest in religious manifestations was limited 
to the discovery of their relations with the social process? 
Did he continue to hold his earlier Comptean view that in-
tellectual maturity moves from theology through philosophy 
to sociology? 
For example, in his earlier period Mannheim was 
concerned to show that the biblical sentence, "The last 
shall be first," was the psychic expression of the revolt 
of oppressed strata, pointing up the "significance of re-
sentment in the fonnation of moral judgments." 1 
In this case, for example, one could say in the case 
of Christianity, it was resentment which gave the 
lower strata courage to emancipate themselves, at 
least psychically, from the domination of an unjust 
system of values and to set up their own in opposition 
1 Ibid., p. 25. 
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to it. We do not intend to raise the question here 
whether with the aid of this psychological-genetic 
analysis we can decide whether the Christians or the 
Roman ruling classes were in the right.l 
From this decidedly functionalist approach of his early 
years, he shifted gradually toward a more substantive ap-
proach to religion and value and the understanding of the 
self. Particularly in his later discussions of religion, 
he appears to be more aware of the limits of sociological 
analysis. His study of religion seems to have led him to 
new insight into the archaic regions of the human person-
ality, and a new understanding of basic religious experi-
ences that lie beyond the realm of logic and science. 
In answer to the question of what can be done to 
foster a "rebirth in the depths of the soul," Mannheim 
suggests that the need is to nurture the "archaic poten-
tialities in the mind and society," the basic visions of 
life which are "intuitive, integrating and directly re-
lated to the deepest sources of human experience."2 
These basic experiences, he claims, must be distinguished 
from the forms of intellectual life which are merely 
instrumental, analytical, or utilitarian. He does not 
want his apologia for the non-rational powers of the mind 
1Ibid. 
-
2Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 131. 
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to be misappropriated for the "support of a new medieval-
ism" or to be seen as a discrediting of the rational and 
critical spirit of modern thought. "The only thing to 
do," he declares, "is to strengthen the sense of what is 
genuine in human utterances and to teach the new genera-
tion to discriminate between artificial surrogates and the 
real sources of spiritual regeneration."1 
Mannheim notes certain basic religious needs of 
man, some "inalienable features in human nature" which 
constitute the ontological basis of man's expression of 
religion, and without the satisfaction of which human life 
remains in a state of intolerable anxiety. Moreover, he 
maintains that men will not be satisfied with "scientific" 
interpretations that fail to answer these basic needs. 
In the same way, calm assurance that the highest thing 
in life is communion with One to whom we can speak and 
who will respond with unfailing understanding and for-
giveness is so deeply ingrained that despondency would 
reign if this religious belief were lost. Only through 
satisfaction of these deep-rooted aspirations (that 
there is a Purpose in what we are doing, and that there 
is a Personal Power to whom man can appeal) can man 
develop the sense of belonging in a world where he can 
find his place and where there is an order that sup-
ports him and dispels his anxieties.2 
1Ibid. 
-
~eim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 289. 
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At this deepest level of the human psyche, the very 
core of mental activity exists in the form c•f "paradigmatic 
experiences." 
"Paradigmatic experiences" in our conte~:t will mean 
those decisive, basic experiences which are felt to 
reveal the meaning of life as a whole. Their pat-
tern is so deeply impressed upon our mitlld that they 
provide a mould into which further expex·iences flow. 
Thus O!lCe formed they lend shape to late~r experi-
ences.l 
Mannheim illustrates what he means by pointi.ng directly to 
Jakob Burkhardt's idea of "primordial images." and Carl 
Jung' s meaning of "archetypes."2 He rather casually 
equates his views with both of those men. H.owever, 
Mannheim does not argue the question of whether biological 
inheritance or the collective unconscious be.st accounts 
for the presence of these prototypes of experience, but 
insists that the sheer fact of their presence in the 
history of our cultural development and the social func-
tion they fulfill are the important considerations. What 
is most important, he points out, is the "un.filled gap" 
and the psychic disturbance which is caused when these 
images or prototypes disappear. 3 
Mannheim acknowledges that mere observation of the 
functional or adjustment character of action does not 
1Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 172. 
2Ibid. 
-
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describe it fully. More basic than the adjustment pat-
terns is the Weltanschauung, which is select:ive with 
reference to alternative types of adjustment:, accepting 
some and rejecting others. But beyond the ~reltanschauung 
lies something even more basic, which provides the cri-
terion of its selection and which to the given 
Weltanschauung "reveals the meaning of life in general."1 
Here is the answer, Mannheim claims, to the problem of 
the relation between morality and religion. "The reli-
gious focus is not a moral or ethical experi.ence, nor a 
way of regulating behaviour and conduct, but: a way of 
interpreting life from the centre of some paradigmatic 
experience."2 These foci of experience may be The Hero, 
Prometheus, Virgo of Greek religion, or, in Christian 
experience, the suffering Job, sovereign lo'\i'e upon the 
Cross, the act of Redemption. One' s behavic•r and conduct 
are always reinterpreted from these foci of experience, 
when these basic images are kept alive in h~~an experience. 
But, Mannheim notes that in "secularized Euz~opean history" 
these basic visions of life have evaporated, and with 
their passing have gone the basic criteria c•f value, for 
all that is left are the empty criteria of adjustment and 
efficiency. "Right and wrong only means eff:iciency, and 
1 ~·' p. 134. 2Ibid. 
-
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there is no answer to the question: Efficiency for What?"1 
In Mannheim's view of the paradigmatic experience, 
he seems to be suggesting this as the ultimate referent of 
the individual's system of values, the ultimate justifica-
tion and point of reference for an order of value-claims 
upon his behavior and conduct. But what gives authenticity 
or legitimacy to these basic archetypal visions of life? 
Mannheim states that there are "some basic experiences 
which carry more weight than others, and which are unfor-
gettable in comparison with others that are merely passing 
sensations."2 He offers no further elaboration or ex-
planation as to why some basic visions lay heavy claim upon 
the individual and others do not. The claim itself appears 
to be the basic fact with which Mannheim is concerned, and 
it is its own justification, empirically evident but be-
yond logical explanation, a given of the ontological 
structure of mind, though not functionally isolated from 
the processes of the mind. 
These paradigmata, these basic visions of life's 
meaning, become the foundations for developing levels 
of value consciousness, as well as the concrete integrat-
ing principle of a world-view. The basic vision which 
claims the person becomes the criterion of acceptance or 
1 ~., p. 135. 2Ibid., p. 134. 
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rejection of certain social, political, and economic pat-
terns of organization. The paradigmata are inherently 
value orientations. As fundamental interpretations of 
the meaning of life, they communicate some ultimate value 
or values, from which may be derived an entire hierarchy 
of values which are relevant to the various levels and 
the various spheres of human experience. They must, in 
fact, be translated into these various levels of existence, 
or they will be irrelevant. 
For Mannheim, the content of religious experience 
is no static thing, but rather he insists that "a trans-
mutation of the religious substance is continually at 
work."1 By this he means that religion in some phases 
exists on the level of "purely personal experience," as 
in the mystics; sometimes it "flows into the mould of 
fellowship," and at other times it "permeates the whole 
pattern of social organization." In still other phases 
it may crystallize into habits of thought, or be expressed 
in "petrified ritual practices. n 2 
The paradigmata of religious experience must be 
translated into the idioms of modern society. He points 
out how Dostoevsky translated archaic religious experi-
ences and the ancient conflicts of the religious mind, into 
1rbid.' p. 128. 
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contemporary situations. Dostoevsky's art, Mannheim con-
tends, is a "marriage of genuine archaic, religious sub-
stance and modern forms of interpretation."! 
It is not contradictory to be moved by an ancient 
vision as the basic experience of life and to under-
stand the needs and potentialities of a new situa-
tion. The first gives direction to all action--the 
latter makes for presentness and prevents us from 
becoming absentees from the historical process.2 
This kind of integration, between the controlling vision 
of life and the contemporaneity of values, is a necessity, 
Mannheim contends, if modern man is not to lapse into 
barbarism or to "'progress• into a despiritualized realm 
of mere analysis and sophistication." 3 Here is where 
Mannheim calls upon theory to provide something positive 
and fruitful in this integrative task of religion. 
Theory, he maintains, can achieve something besides merely 
"chilling the authentic experience with the cold blast of 
reflection."4 Theory, in the ethical, aesthetic, and 
religious realm, can provide for a "re-patterning of the 
original [paradigmatic] experience, by which light is 
thrown upon it from an entirely new side."5 
1Ibid., p. 131. 2 ~., p. 143. 
3 Ibid., p. 131. 
p. 40. 
~annheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
5Ibid . 
.............. 
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Theory, then, interprets and re-interprets the 
original paradigmata in terms of the contemporary situa-
tion. The "Truths" of the paradigmatic experiences are 
given only as direction and not as rigid prescript, 
Mannheim suggests. It is this directionality or implicit 
value orientation, which presumably indicates their 
normative character. Mannheim mentions specifically two 
characteristics of a normative value; first, it leaves 
great scope for adaptation, and second, it "prevents man 
from getting lost in the endless possibilities of chang-
ing his behaviour."1 It is not exactly clear whether 
he regards the paradigmata themselves as norms, or whether 
the norms are derived from them. At times he seems to re-
gard the paradigmatic experiences themselves as norms, and 
at other times these appear to be experiential symbols from 
which the directional or normative values are inferred, or 
systematically educed. There is evidence that the latter 
view is more likely what he had in mind, as he discusses 
the task of religion and its functions of interpretation 
and integration. 
The integrative task of religion has several 
dimensions to it, according to Mannheim. First, it must 
set forth guidelines for values, as well as general moral 
~annheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 118. 
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principles which stem from the basic paradigmatic vision 
of life. Further, these must be elaborated into a set of 
concrete patterns of behavior, and an "image of satis-
factory social institutions" which embody the above-
mentioned moral principles. Finally, the development of a 
world-view which embodies and embraces the above values 
and patterns of behavior must be elaborated. These are 
to be offered not as "dictatorial rules set down by a 
minority" but as the "fruits of creative imagination put 
at the disposal of those who crave for a consistent way of 
life."1 
What he seems to be suggesting, in effect, is the 
translation of a set of "ultimate values" into a system 
of middle axioms or directional norms. It is impossible to 
know precisely, for he neither gives an unequivocal defini-
tion of value nor an elaborate definition of what he means 
by ~· Regarding a ~' he only suggests that it offer 
scope for adaptation, and directionality for life. The 
following illustration will help to demonstrate Mannheim's 
view of the directional values or norms which are derived 
from the ultimate values of the paradigmata of Christian 
experience. Both directionality and scope for adaptation 
are evident. 
1rbid.' p. 111. 
137 
It is possible to love your neighbour whom you know 
personally, but it is an impossible demand to love 
people of a wider area whom you do not even know. 
. • . It is the paradox of Christianity that it 
tried to apply the virtues of a society based upon 
neighbourly relationships to the world at large. 
• • • The solution to the paradox is that the com-
mandment "Love your neighbour" should not be taken 
literally but should be translated according to the 
conditions of a great society. This consists in 
setting up institutions embodying some abstract 
principle which corresponds to the primary virtue 
of sympathy and brotherliness. The equal political 
rights of citizens in a democracy are abstract 
equivalents of the concrete primary virtues of 
sympathy and brotherliness.l 
In the above illustration the norms derived from 
the basic vision of Christian faith would be meaningless 
and functionless, if they were not translated into the 
idiom of the new situation. It is the method of transla-
tion which makes the value system function once more and 
which determines the relevance or irrelevance of the 
religious vision. 
It is apparent that Mannheim moved considerably 
away from his earlier rationalistic and functionalistic 
view of religion and toward a more substantive view, or at 
least toward a mixture of these two ways of understanding 
religious phenomena. From his earlier view of religion as 
a secondary phenomenon, he eventually assigned to religion 
the task of an ultimate integration of all human activities. 
1 Ibid., p. 18. 
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He concluded that in religion, freed from authoritarianism 
and superstition, was to be found the authentic vision of 
life and the exemplary patterns of human conduct. The 
paradigmatic experiences of religion, archetypal symbols 
of the meaning of life, are seen to be the ultimate refer-
ence points for a system of values, which are derived from 
that basic meaning. To the extent that these derived 
values provide scope for adjustment, and directionality 
for life orientation, they may be said to be normative. 
Hence, normative values must be both contextually related, 
as to their adjustment potential for relevant changes in 
the modern environment, as well as related to the whole 
meaning of life and to the ultimate values of the para-
digmatic vision. 
CHAPTER V 
CRITIQUE OF MANNHEIM'S AXIOLOGICAL 
PRESUPPOSITIONS 
1. Fact and Value 
In the statement of the problem of the disserta-
tion, one of the crucial questions was that of the rela-
tionship between Mannheim's epistemological claims and his 
axiological presuppositions. The question of this rela-
tionship implies a number of other questions. How does 
Mannheim conceive of "knowing"? What is the relation 
between "fact" and "value"? How does Mannheim distinguish 
the two terms? Do "facts" and "values" have a common 
ontological source, or do they arise from different 
sources? 
On the basis of the foregoing exposition of 
Mannheim's epistemological claims (Chapter III) and the 
analysis of the value components of his system (Chapter IV), 
it would appear that he conceives of "facts" and "values" 
as dual aspects of the experience of "knowing." They are 
distinguishable but inseparable dimensions of the knowing 
process. That is to say, they are distinguishable as 
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aspects of human experience, but are inseparably mixed to-
gether within the content of experience itself. 
This distinction is not unequivocally stated by 
Mannheim himself, but is a logical consequence of his dis-
cussion of the valuational processes and the cognitive 
processes. Most of the time these appear to refer to one 
and the same thing, namely, a basic life process in which 
the individual evolves a knowledge of the world in which he 
lives; i.e., life in a community of persons within the con-
text of which he derives a Weltanschauung, a system of 
values, and a basic inventory of "factual" and "valuational" 
knowledge. To "know' is to perceive both a "factual" con-
tent and a "valuational" content in the object of knowledge. 
It appears to make no difference to Mannheim what the ob-
ject of knowledge is, whether theoretical, aesthetic, his-
torical, scientific, or otherwise, so far as this under-
lying "evaluational" or "interest-oriented" base of knowl-
edge is concerned. He does, occasionally, exempt mathe-
matics and such similar disciplines from this hypothesis. 
Speaking more specifically of knowledge in the 
social sciences, such knowledge, he maintains, is neither 
"mechanistically external nor formal," nor even basically 
quantitative, but rather constitutes "situational diag-
noses" which are premised upon the same thought-models as 
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were "created for activistic purposes in real life."1 
It is clear, furthermore, that every social science 
diagnosis is closely connected with the evaluations 
and unconscious orientations of the observer and that 
the critical self-clarification of the social sci-
ences is intimately bound up with the critical self-
clarification of our orientation in the every day 
world.2 
The human quest for understanding arises always 
out of action, out of real life situations that are per-
meated with value and laden with the aspirations, desires, 
and goal-orientations of the individual seeker. Thus there 
is no such thing as a naked fact, stripped of valuational 
elements. Agreeing with Troeltsch, Mannheim makes both 
the selection of facts and the objectivity of historical 
knowledge dependent upon the concrete aspirations of con-
temporary man. He takes Troeltsch's connection between 
"standard of value" and "cultural synthesis within the 
present" to be the foundation of a theory of history as 
well as a theory of knowledge. 3 Thus the problem of ob-
jectivity in historical science is brought closer to the 
level of concrete research by making it a "matter of ac-
tual, substantive evaluation."4 The rigid alternatives 
~nheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 45. 
2Ibid. 
~annheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 102. 
4 Ibid. , p. 10 3 . 
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of true and false, Mannheim contends, are totally inade-
quate for dealing with the qualitative and evaluative as-
pects of historical truth. Man is a valuing creature and 
truth is a supreme value. A theory of knowledge which 
strips man of everything vital, corporeal, evaluative and 
historical is sub-human. 1 
Mannheim's use of the word "perspective" clearly 
demonstrates his understanding of the two facets of human 
knowledge, the cognitive and the valuational. The word 
"perspective," he suggests, signifies not only the manner 
of perception and the content of that perception, but also 
the qualitative way in which the individual construes the 
object of knowledge within his thinking. 2 These qualita-
tive and valuational elements are supra-logical, and are 
always ingredients of the knowledge situation. 
This practical inseparability of fact and value, 
even though they are theoretically distinguishable aspects 
of experience, may be a partial reason for Mannheim's fail-
ure to give a more articulate accounting of the value prob-
lem. The valuational side of experience is rarely singled 
out by Mannheim for special consideration. By phrases 
such as "qualitative understanding113 and "meaningful 
1Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 297. 
2Ibid., p. 272. 3Ibid. 
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character of knowledge" 1 Mannheim subsumes all the valu-
ational aspects as well as the factual content of knowl-
edge. His repeated emphasis upon the contingency of 
"selectivity of facts" and "valuational substrata" seems 
to blind him to the need for further differentiation of 
the value problem and the necessity of distinguishing 
clearly the normative aspects of value from the functional 
aspects. 
Mannheim' s concepts of "knowledge" and "valuation" 
are both so broad as to offer little directive for dis-
tinguishing various types of knowledge and of value. It 
is not that he sees no qualitative difference in "facts" 
or "values." He insists that it is a falsely understood 
empiricism which collects all facts indiscriminately as 
if one were as good as the next. "Facts are only of 
equal value," he maintains, "for someone who is more or 
less indifferent to the real course of events and who does 
not have to take action, so that the major trends in events 
seem unimportant."2 Such a senseless collection of facts 
only produces a "cultivated blindness" to the true nature 
of the world in which we live. And yet, for all this 
1~.' p. 21. 
2Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 231. 
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insistence upon the unequal value of facts, Mannheim never 
seems to offer an articulate distinction between the levels 
of science and common sense, between rational judgment and 
fundamental folkways, or between other types of "knowing." 
His own faith, however, is always on the side of rational-
ity, aiming toward a coherent view of the world, where the 
community of persons is constantly reaching toward a more 
harmonious synthesis in every dimension of the life proces-
ses. "Knowledge" is, for Mannheim, the instrument for 
achieving that complex goal. He frankly admits that he is 
offering a less-than-systematic view of the problem of 
knowledge, but sees, nonetheless, real significance in 
presenting a preliminary and fragmentary view as an in-
termediary step in the historical transition of self-
understanding. 
If we advocate a comprehensive view of that which is 
not yet synthesizable into a system, we do this be-
cause we regard it as the relative optimum possibil-
ity in our present situation, and because in so do-
ing we believe (as is always the case in history) we 
are taking the necessary steps preparatory to the 
next synthesis.! 
He acknowledges also the value-premise of the above state-
ment, namely, that the suggestion of a synthesis from the 
most comprehensive and most progressive point of view pre-
supposes the value-judgment of "dynamic intellectual 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 188. 
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mediation." "Certainly we would be the last," Mannheim 
declares, "to deny that we have made this value-judgment."1 
Thus he attempts to be consistent in his view of "total 
ideology," in making it applicable to his own world-view 
and his own theoretical assumptions. 
Mannheim claims a limited kinship with the phen-
omenological school, in interpreting the "existential 
relativity" of "certain items of knowledge," by which he 
means "objects encountered in the living process of 
history." 2 But what other kinds of objects are there, 
that human beings can know anything about, unless he means 
to exclude mathematical "objects" or other similar types 
of mental products. Proper analysis of experience, he 
contends, does not lead to a relativism in which every-
body and nobody is right. What it implies rather is a 
"relationism which says that certain (qualitative) truths 
cannot even be grasped, or formulated, except in the 
framework of an existential correlation between subject 
and object." 3 Truth about human existence has both 
factual and valuational content, and both facts and 
1 Ibid., p. 189. 
2Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 194. 
3Ibid. 
-
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values are relationally defined as aspects of the relation 
between subject and object. Mannheim uses the words 
"knowledge," "truth," and "cognitive act" somewhat indis-
criminately, and it is difficult to know just what he means 
by each. MOst frequently, however, he appears to regard 
"knowledge" as the product of cognitive activity, the 
"basic cultural inventory" which he mentions frequently, 
and "truth" as a sort of flexible ideal. Discussing the 
existential determinants of thought, Mannheim comments that 
they not only influence the practical results of thought, 
but "they also condition the ideal of truth which this 
living being is able to construct from the products of 
thought." 1 
This "ideal of truth" which Mannheim refers to is 
not at all as casual a notion as it might appear to be in 
the above context. His ideal of truth embodies the norms 
of coherence, rationality, and progressive synthesis, 
whose value equivalents would be the norms of harmony, 
integrity, and dynamic reconciliation. The problem of 
value norms will be discussed more fully in a subsequent 
section of this chapter. Mannheim's rather decided reac-
tion against the idea of a "realm of Truth as such" does 
1Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 298. 
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not prevent him from postulating Truth as a" concrete ideal," 
based upon the unity of personal experience and the co-
herently structured elements of consciousness. Mannheim's 
sociology of knowledge does not invalidate the use of human 
reason, but instead attempts to validate reason by purging 
it of its existential capricious ingredients. Self-
conscious rationality, Mannheim contends, is a more effec-
tive weapon for truth than an unsophisticated and dogmatic 
reason, blind to its own perspectival biases. Furthermore, 
he insists upon the unity of the analytic and synthetic 
method, utilizing a synoptic approach as the means to a 
more comprehensive view of the whole. The valuational 
order itself provides the clue to the interpretation of 
the whole, since values inhere in the personal experience 
of the interpreter and exert a normative claim upon ex-
istence. All experience, and hence all knowledge of val-
ues, is grounded in a cosmic dynamic creative process. 
It is value which offers a basis of interpretation of the 
physical world, not the reverse. 
These principles are in close accord with person-
alistic premises, at least in their rudimentary outline. 
In the process of sociologizing, Mannheim's system has 
transcended itself as sociology and has become philosophy, 
not consciously but subtly and inarticulately. Mannheim's 
sociological quest for "inner understanding" first of all 
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erased the lines of distinction between philosophy and so-
ciology, then eliminated philosophy and supplanted it with 
sociology. Finally, his sociological quest took upon it-
self the concerns and the functions of philosophy. Then, 
as was noted in the discussion of his concern for religion 
and his study of archetypes and paradigmatic experiences, 
he began to move a little closer to a renewed understanding 
of the legitimate differentiation between sociology and 
the fields of theology, philosophy, ethics. This last con-
clusion should not be pushed too far, however, for it is 
evident that even to the end of his life, while he recog-
nized the legitimacy of these other disciplines, he really 
expected from sociology the most sophisticated and most 
genuine understanding of human nature. 
2. The Contextual Character of Value 
Mannheim's emphasis upon the contextual character 
of value is a theme which permeated virtually every cate-
gory of value in the preceding chapter. The contextual 
emphasis was present not only in the section dealing with 
"instrumental value" but was also evident in the discus-
sions of personality, communitarianism, freedom, conscience, 
etc. It was pointed out that Mannheim gave very serious 
attention to the pragmatic and contextual emphases of 
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Dewey, Mead, and others. Much of his argument leans heavily 
on pragmatic theses: cognitive processes as part of the 
evolutionary struggle; adjustment character of value; 
thought as an instrument of cognition; probabilism or per-
spectival validity. In spite of these emphases, there is 
much evidence that Mannheim attempted to go beyond prag-
matism, beyond contextualism, beyond what he considered to 
be the moral myopia of a contextualist view of value. 
Objecting to the superficialities of much pragmatic 
understanding of human nature, he emphasizes that "society 
is rooted in deeper layers of the human soul" than is gen-
erally recognized. 1 He consciously seeks to avoid the 
dangers of moralrigidity derived from abstract value sys-
tems on the one hand, and the dangers of "wayward flex-
ibility" and relativistic historicism on the other. 2 
Under relativism, Mannheim contends, moral obligation can-
not exist, whereas in his relational theory of value there 
!! moral obligation and this moral obligation "is derived 
from the concrete situation to which it is related."3 
1Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 123. 
2Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 41. 
3 Ibid., p. 212. 
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Mannheim tries to attend both to the question of "Why" 
moral commands should be obeyed, as well as to the question 
of "How'' moral imperatives can be obeyed if conditions of 
life are continually changing. It is the problem of equi-
librium between these two facets of the moral issue that 
constitutes the problem for Mannheim. While he acknowl-
edges that the pragmatists pointed up this important dis-
tinction, he cautions that "those who think, as the prag-
matists do, that they have already found an answer to the 
questions they raised, will equally remain blind to the 
real magnitude of the problem of valuations."1 
The difficulty in the pragmatist's answer is that 
it either identifies successful adjustment with 
right and wrong behaviour, or does not realize that 
by supporting individual spontaneity as the absolute 
claim he himself introduces unconsciously precon-
ceived ideals of right conduct. In other words, the justification of a type of behaviour as being an ef-
ficient piece of adjustment to a given situation does 
not yet determine its being right or wrong from a 
Christian or a non-Christian point of view.2 
Mannheim proceeds to point out that the person who 
denies the significance of "spiritual norms" may appear to 
adjust to the social situation as well as the Christian 
does, but that there is a profound difference between them. 
The difference is that the Christian does not simply want 
~annheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 133. 
2Ibid. 
-
151 
to adjust to the world in general nor to the "particle of 
environment" in which he momentarily sees himself. The 
Christian, Mannheim observes, seeks not just any adjust-
ment but an adjustment which is "in harmony with his basic 
experience of life."1 Mannheim protests the usual narrow 
definition of adjustment which tends to see a single 
"adequate" response to a given stimulus. He speaks of 
"real" adjustment as a creative response of the total 
organism to the total environment, involving a "continual 
liberation of new energies, a permanent give-and-take be-
tween the original conditions and the human being."2 In 
discussing "Christian valuation" he analyzes two facets, 
one of which is "beyond the reach of the pragmatist." 
One facet is the general adjustment character of values 
and behavior; the second facet is expressed in the fact 
that the Christian wants to adjust himself with reference 
to certain normative patterns of action. He notes that the 
basic vision of life possessed by Christian faith provides 
a normative pattern, a fundamental value orientation with 
reference to which all action, and all options open for 
choice, is judged. This normative facet is, in fact, 
characteristic of any "valuation guided by a deeper purpose 
1Ibid. 
-
2 Ibid., p. 170. 
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than ~ survival and some equilibrium with the surround-
ing world." 1 
This discussion of Christian valuation is one of 
the few places in which Mannheim makes a conscious and 
articulate distinction between the functional-adjustment 
character of value and the normative aspects. The dis-
tinction is generally present in Mannheim's approach, but 
is an implied rather than a declared assumption. For 
example, in the discussion of the category inclusive-
exclusive in the foregoing chapter, the category itself 
implies a normative distinction, but in the illustrations 
from Mannheim's writings the normative distinction was not 
at all explicit. In this discussion of Christian action, 
Mannheim does make the normative aspects of value explicit, 
in declaring that the norms of Christian vision have con-
tinually to be reinterpreted. "This substance [Christian 
faith] again and again focusses thought and activity on 
certain issues and differentiates the otherwise homogeneous 
challenges of the environment and the responses to them 
into desirable and undesirable ones."2 This view of 
Mannheim's is far different from the usual pragmatic 
criterion of efficiency, which usually leaves unanswered 
the question "efficiency for what?" Persistent pursuit of 
1 Ibid., p. 142. 
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efficiency, Mannheim notes, emasculates human activity by 
making it progressively devoid of purpose; disintegration 
of character and conduct ensue, with eventual paralysis of 
cooperative activities as the deeper purposes vanish from 
its institutions. 1 
Mannheim's contextualism calls for rationally de-
termined valuational norms which can provide for contin-
uity through change, which enable one to deal with the 
challenge of res novae without becoming the victim of 
change. This normative source of direction must provide 
the individual with a "demarcation line" which informs 
him clearly which possible types of adjustment are "right" 
for him and which are "wrong." Means and ends must both 
be normatively defined. In this regard also, Mannheim's 
thought may be differentiated from most contemporary 
pragmatism. Here it differs from the naturalistic assump-
tions of Dewey, for example. 
Pragmatism, according to Mannheim, tends to define 
context in narrow, individualistic terms. The "situation" 
or "context" is the characteristic unit of valuation, but 
these are to be understood as highly complex configurations. 
It is important to relate in one's mind the different 
series of events, and to see one's own life history in 
1Ibid. 
-
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terms of a larger life history. By contextualism Mannheim 
seeks to emphasize "presentness" as a "genuine value," for 
by presentness one exists in continual tension between what 
is and what is to come. 
Presentness in the sphere of moral, religious and cul-
tural experience means continual return to central ex-
periences which transfuse their spirit into new situa-
tions. Thus it means continual rebirth, a continual 
re-valuftion and reinterpretation of the same sub-
stance. 
In this view, Mannheim apparently abandons some of 
his earlier intellectual convictions. In his earlier 
years, he assumed that for each historical context there 
was a corresponding situationally adequate type of be-
havior. Ideas or values which did not "fit" into the cur-
rent order were "situationally transcendent or unreal." 
Ideas and values which corresponded to a concretely exist-
ing historical order he designated as "adequate and situ-
ationally congruous." This view was the theme of his 
epistemological conclusions outlined in Chapter III. More-
over, he wrote that only a mind which had been "sociolog-
ically fully clarified" could operate with situationally 
2 congruous ideas and valuations. He apparently came to 
realize that the question of a valuational "fit" required 
1Ibid.' p. 122. 
2Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 194. 
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some notion of historical purpose; that "congruity" pre-
supposed some desired goals; and that a criterion of 
"adequacy" requires a set of given ends toward which be-
havior is oriented. His awareness of this problem is 
later somewhat humorously expressed in his paraphrase of 
a remark by another writer: "Even the pigeons in Trafalgar 
Square adjust themselves to the presence of the National 
Gallery in their environment, but the question is if 
theirs is a relevant and adequate adjustment to the real 
purpose of the object."1 
Even with Mannheim's broadly defined contextualism 
and his pointing up of the normative facet of valuations, 
certain key questions remain to be dealt with in the fol-
lowing sections of this chapter. What is his ultimate 
basis of valuational norms, and what are the criteria of 
judgment for those norms? How does he propose to arrive 
at a transhistorical "standard of value" and a contempo-
rary "cultural synthesis"? 
3. The Problem of Norms 
Mannheim sees the problem of axiological norms as 
being very much analogous to the problem Socrates faced in 
1rbid. 
-
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the context of a rapidly broadening intellectual horizon 
and the consequent questions and doubts of the Sophists. 
Psychoanalysis, sociological analysis, ideological debunk-
ing, and scientism in general have stirred up intellectual 
doubt and moral confusion. History has left modern man 
with: (a) no universally accepted set of moral axioms, 
(b) no universally recognized hierarchy of values, and 
(c) a confusing set of radically differing epistemologies 
and ontologies. 1 Contemporary man, Mannheim contends, is 
under moral obligation to search for a solution to the 
problem of historicism. That problem is: "How are moral 
norms possible in the midst of constant historical flux and 
cultural change?" 
Mannheim protests against that philosophic view 
which admits that the content of moral behavior is exis-
tentially determined but retains the idea of eternal 
forms. But here he sets up a false polarization by insist-
ing that the choice is between his "dynamic relationalism" 
and some kind of moral absolutism. 2 He repeatedly sets 
the problem in terms of the static versus the dynamic 
personality. The static personality thinks in terms of 
1Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 207. 
2Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 81. 
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rigid moral absolutes. The dynamic personality is pro-
gressive, possessed of moral equilibrium, appreciative of 
the changing conditions under which moral choice occurs. 1 
The "stationary type accepts each condition as a timeless 
order of existence" while the "dynamic seeker dispels 
false absolutes" and concentrates on the conditional and 
finite realm of things. 2 This tendency toward a false 
polarization of alternatives does not, in fact, help him 
to clarify the problem. 
There is a considerable problem involved in trying 
to determine just what Mannheim means by a !!.2!:!!!. He re-
peatedly uses the word "norm," and speaks of situations 
being inseparably related to "concrete norms." Further 
confusion is added when on certain occasions he equates 
"values" and "norms. " 3 He speaks of "codes and norms, ,,4 
"public norms," 5 and mentions the search for "new norms." 
1Mannheim, Essaxs on Sociologx and Social Psx-
chology, p. 212. 
p. 92. 
~annheim, Essaxs on the Sociologx of Culture, 
p. 50. 
3Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
~nheim, Diagnosis of OUr Time, p. 74. 
5Mannheim, Essaxs on Sociologx and Social Psx-
chologx, p. 248. 
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He also states that "changing norms are mostly the expres-
sion of the changing habits and attitudes of man."1 But 
in spite of this constant usage, he never explicitly states 
what he conceives a norm to be. He states that norms are 
"the expression of an interplay between individual and 
group adjustment," and that they "change with the changing 
social order," and that they are not absolute and unalter-
able decrees. 2 But all of this does not say what they are. 
He has only pointed to their changing character and to 
their functional relationships. 
The most significant clue to Mannheim's meaning of 
the word "norm" is to be found in his analysis of the 
"paradigmatic experience," and the unconscious "archetypal 
image," discussed in Chapter IV. These, he claims, are 
"norms which satisfy the needs of the unconscious mind." 3 
That is to say, the paradigmatic experience as a basic 
qualitative vision of life, has within it an inherent 
value claim. This value-claim gives directionality and 
meaning to all of life. It offers a focus for reinter-
pretation of all experience, and has no ulterior 
1Karl Mannheim, "German Sociology 1918-1933," 
Politics, February (1934), p. 16. 
2Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 74. 
3rbid., p. 170. 
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justification. The paradigmatic experience is basically 
a symbolic psychic statement of the meaningful goal of 
human existence, and the frame of reference for judging 
moral experience and for making valuational decisions. 1 
Formerly Mannheim had sought for valuational sanc-
tions within the historical process, within the intelli-
gible and comprehensive totality. This inclination is 
evident in his earlier writings. However, with the emer-
gence of totalitarianism in Germany it was evident that 
history was capable of producing a period of destructive-
ness beyond imagination and could not be the guarantor 
of values. After his exodus from Germany in 19 33, 
Mannheim sought a new understanding of the value problem. 
It was at this point that he developed the idea of the 
"paradigmatic experience" as the clue to arriving at a 
normative understanding of value. With this theme came a 
more intensive voluntaristic emphasis, for the aberration 
of fascism could only be defeated by active will organized 
around !!!. exemplary vision of life. One needed some kind 
of extra-historical standards of value to resist and 
counteract the aberrant trends. This did not mean that 
one could disregard the processes of history or ignore 
its comprehensive and interrelated nature, but it meant 
1Ibid. 
-
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that ultimate value-claims could not simply be judged by 
reference to historical actualities alone. 
In discussing these "paradigmatic" or "archetypal" 
experiences of life, which emerged into conscious life 
from the creative depths of the unconscious mind, Mannheim 
frankly acknowledged that knowledge about such levels of 
psychic life was so primitive that it was virtually "im-
possible to state either positive or negative rules and 
correlations" about such phenomena. 1 It would appear that 
Mannheim's claim for their normative character lay in the 
fact that they give directionality to the rest of life, 
and provide a "mold" into which other experiences flow, 
giving "shape" to these other experiences. 2 
However, this discussion of archetypes and para-
digmatic experiences does not exhaust Mannheim's use of 
the word "norm." It is evident that he thought of norms 
as functioning throughout all levels of the social process, 
judging from his use of the term in such a variety of 
contexts: public norms, institutional norms, norms of 
sub-groups in society, etc. 
As was pointed out in the concluding section of 
Chapter IV, Mannheim noted two characteristics of a norm. 
Even these, however, are mentioned only incidentally and 
1Ibid. 
-
2Ibid., p. 172. 
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with very little further elaboration of their meaning. The 
two characteristics Mannheim mentioned were scope for adap-
tation and directionality for life, i.e., preventing man 
from "getting lost in the endless possibilities of chang-
ing his behavior." Normative values, in other words, pro-
vide a directional orientation and yet are adaptible to 
changing life situations. They provide direction even 
while accommodating to change. 
Other characteristics of norms may be educed from 
Mannheim's writings, even though he does not give an ex-
plicit accounting of what he means by the word "norm." In 
discussing the problem of judgment in ethical disputes he 
mentions two criteria by which men may judge "changes in 
morality and their effects on practical affairs." The 
two criteria which he mentions are "the range of people's 
foresight" and "the range of their sense of responsibility."! 
What he seems to be referring to here is the anticipation of 
consequences, as well as the accountability of persons for 
a broad range of moral behavior. Implicitly, then, valua-
tional norms have reference to the future, and to the ques-
tion of what ought to be. Moral accountability, on the 
personal level, involves responsibility for the anticipatory 
1Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
~, p. 67. 
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values of this ought claim. This ought claim is another 
characteristic of a norm, as implied in Mannheim's ap-
proach. 
Both the ought claim and the directional values 
are seen by Mannheim to require participation in a process 
of continual synthesis. 1 For example, anarchist and 
totalitarian points of view can be dealt with so long as 
the "synthesizing power of the public mind can see them 
as extremes of a series, the center of which is firm 
enough to balance both ends." There is a certain "reality 
level" maintained as long as this synthesizing power is 
sustained, and norms must somehow be rooted in that reality 
level. By reality level, Mannheim only refers to the 
fact that every society has a "mental climate in which 
certain facts and their interrelations are considered 
basic and called 'real.'"2 Hence, the term directionalit;x 
(which points to the ultimate value orientation of the 
paradigmata) needs to have the adjective "synthetic" 
preceding it, to emphasize the synthesizing frame of 
reference which Mannheim has in view. Synthetic direc-
tionality is another characteristic of a norm implied in 
1Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 140. 
2 ~., p. 139. 
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Mannheim's discussion. 
The aforementioned notion of a "reality level" 
was defined by a sort of provisional consensus. It is im-
portant to note that Mannheim means much more than mere 
theoretical agreement on certain issues. To him, consensus 
is equated with common life and "to prepare the ground for 
consensus eventually means to prepare the ground for 
common life."1 Thus, in this sense, a nonnative value is 
one which fulfills this criterion. 
Comprehensiveness is another frequently implied 
characteristic of a norm. In discussing the problem of 
judgment in valuational issues, he continually refers to 
"constructive integration" and "constructive compromise," 
emphasizing all the while a need for "broadened experi-
ence" and "expanded vision" and "breadth of judgment. " 2 
This comprehensiveness of a norm is such that it could, 
presumably, take into account varying levels of inclusive-
ness and exclusiveness, as well as the changing and perma-
nent aspects of experience, the reciprocal needs of self 
and community, and so forth. 
1Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 28. 
2Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
p. 169f. 
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Coherence is likewise, both implicitly and ex-
plicitly, a constantly emphasized theme in Mannheim's dis-
cussion of value. In referring to the need for a dynamic 
system of standards for interpreting the value hierarchies 
of history, it is coherence which provides the crucial 
criterion of judgment. 1 Again, he discusses the fact that 
the "democratic pattern of struggle and discussion" en-
ables different values and value systems to be amalgamated 
into a "dynamically balanced pattern" of agreements. 2 
Mannheim's view continually calls forth a "dynamic logic" 
in which coherence is a primary test of the validity of 
historical "truths" and a primary criterion by which the 
normative character of their valuational aspect is judged.3 
The characteristics of a normative value, as educed 
from Mannheim's writings, might be summarized as follows: 
synthetic directionality; scope for adaptation; inherent 
ought claim; provisional consensus; comprehensiveness; 
coherence. These characteristics of a norm appear to be 
in many respects parallel to the epistemological criteria 
1Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
p. 105. 
p. 150. 
2Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
~annheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, p. 40. 
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of validity outlined in Chapter III. Mannheim's epis-
temological criteria of unanimity, perspectival synthesis, 
comprehensiveness and fruitfulness are basically epis-
temological equivalents of the above-mentioned axiological 
criteria. A basic difference to be noted is that when 
Mannheim elucidated his epistemological claims, he anti-
cipated that "truth" was somehow self-validating within 
the historical process itself. In his earlier writing, 
especially in Ideology and Utopia, he rejected any extra-
historical principle of interpretation or judgment. He 
insisted, at that time, that history's "wholeness" and 
"comprehensivenessn was itself enough to provide the sig-
nificant clues to ultimate meaning and the true direction 
to the cosmic processes. Later, as he attempted to pene-
trate the problem of value, he was forced to admit that 
socio-historical analysis alone could not uncover the 
ultimate values and purposes of the cosmos, and that per-
haps some extra-historical principle of judgment would 
have to provide the clue to the value problem as well as 
to the problem of truth. 
Even though he acknowledged this extra-historical 
principle as a necessity for further resolving the prob-
lem of "human valuations," he still seemed to cling to 
the hope that sociology (rather than philosophy or the-
ology) could somehow legitimatize the norms which were to 
be derived from the non-rational, extra-logical para-
digmatic experiences. 
4. Mannheim's Axiological Profile 
Mannheim's search for an understanding of the 
166 
"human dialogue" was based upon the firm conviction that it 
is only the historically and existentially committed analyst 
who can truly understand the qualitative meanings and values 
of history. As Mannheim put it: 11 It is only substance 
which comprehends substance."1 In this sociological quest 
he moved from one level of analysis to another, continually 
trying to break through to the inmost layers of man's 
psyche, seeking always the person, the motivating center 
that lay beyond the superficial rationalizations. He saw 
the sickness of a "thing-oriented" and "operational-
oriented" culture, and saw as the task of a democratized 
age the responsibility for breaking through the "screen 
of purely social self-assessment and achiev[ing] communion 
with the existential self, stripped of all social masks." 2 
True knowledge, for Mannheim, involved a grasp of the 
p. 61. 
~annheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
2Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
p. 246. 
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historical processes themselves, including the valuational 
elements of those processes. Knowledge, in his view, in-
volved an active and willful invasion of reality by the 
conscious and purposive mind. In this Mannheim sought, as 
did Hegel, to achieve communion with reality itself. 
There is considerable difficulty in trying to 
"classify" Mannheim's approach in one or another category 
of value theory or ethical theory. Due to his radical 
electicism and continual synthesizing of various elements 
from diverse schools of thought, it is indeed virtually 
impossible to identify him with any particular strand. 
Perhaps the terms "concrete idealism" or "democratic per-
sonalism" would be appropriate terms to designate his gen-
eral orientation, as these are both terms which he occasion-
ally used to designate his essential approach. 1 It should 
be emphasized that he does not use these terms in any self-
conscious manner to designate a systematically worked out 
system. He does use them, as he uses other similar terms, 
to point to a certain tendency, a certain way of inter-
preting experience, a certain way of patterning the ele-
ments of sociological understanding. The term "concrete 
idealism" is helpful in summarizing Mannheim's attempt to 
~annheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
pp. 198, 242. 
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combine what he considered to be genuine in traditional 
idealism with a specific contextualist or pragmatic empha-
sis, thus avoiding what he called "historical absenteeism." 
Likewise, the term "democratic personalism" gathers to-
gether certain of his emphases: e.g., the basic reality 
of the person; the organic relation between person and 
community; a fundamental equalitarianism as the ontological 
basis of freedom, etc. However, neither of these terms 
necessarily implies the full range of axiological assump-
tions that are found to be operative within Mannheim's 
system. 
The analysis of the value components of Mannheim's 
system has resulted in what amounts to a rather extensive 
metaphysics of value. On the basis of this analysis of 
categories, a general metaphysics of value has been 
educed, with a somewhat loosely knit but basically coher-
ent structure. These primary presuppositions are not set 
forth in any articulate fashion by Mannheim himself, but 
can only be educed through a careful analysis of his writ-
ings. Analysis does reveal a basic framework of axiolog-
ical presuppositions, not always carefully worked out, but 
nonetheless evident and operative within his total system. 
1Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, 
pp. 198, 242. 
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This framework of primary presuppositions involves an organic 
relationship between the two poles of the polar categories, 
all of which are related to a central focus on the reality 
of the person within the context of freedom. Value and 
value-theory are both ultimately rooted not only in the ex-
perience of being a person but also in the fundamental act 
of self-valuation. 
While there is a constant emphasis upon rationality 
and upon rational values, Mannheim scarcely offers a con-
crete distinction between judgment and emotional response. 
The problem as such is never specifically discussed, and 
any distinction would merely be implicit. This is a con-
fusion that he shares with many pragmatists, in spite of 
his constant emphasis upon rationality and upon the criteria 
for rationally authenticated values. 
While Mannheim is reluctant to speak of ideals or 
of ideal-values, these words nevertheless do occasionally 
find their way into his vocabulary, and almost always by 
way of criticism of, and as a corrective to, pragmatic 
errors. As was pointed out in the preceding chapters, he 
evidenced strong influences of both Hegel and Marx. Basic-
ally, Mannheim's view is a metaphysical theory of value. 
Conscious experience is the seat of all value, and the 
normative order of value that is so much a part of human 
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experience is rooted in the cosmic processes in which man 
shares intimately. Mannheim penetrated much more deeply 
into the anthropological problem than did Marx. His 
analysis of the ideological problem and his conclusion of 
a neutralized ("non-evaluative") conception of total 
ideology, was a more sophisticated sociological view of 
the knowledge problem than the Marxian approach. He en-
deavored to be consistent in his view of total ideology 
and attempted to apply it to his own perspective as well as 
to others, noting at times that such tenns as "dynamic 
synthesis" and "purposive adjustment" were value judgments 
of his own. At other times, however, and in fact most of 
the time, his own value presuppositions were simply as-
sumed without comment and without acknowledgment. Nowhere 
did he articulately set forth the value judgments which 
guided his thought and which alone give real meaning to 
his whole theoretical position. The inherent framework 
of primary presuppositions noted above, and educed from a 
thorough analysis of Mannheim's writings, shows the ex-
tent of his omission. 
Alongside of the above-mentioned general metaphysics 
of value with its configuration of primary presuppositions, 
there is also a series of what might be ~ermed secondary 
presuppositions which forms the nucleus of a theoretical 
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ethics. What are here referred to as secondary presupposi-
tions are simply those characteristics of a norm (syn-
thetic directionality, scope for adaptation, inherent 
ought claim, provisional consensus, comprehensiveness, co-
herence) which provide the theoretical basis for a norma-
tive view of human behavior and ethical conduct. Such a 
theoretical ethics is very rudimentary to be sure, in 
Mannheim's system, for the presuppositions were not sys-
tematically worked out. Certainly Mannheim had an elabor-
ately worked out social theory, but it was based uncon-
sciously upon what Mannheim considered to be "the enlight-
ened values of the age" and was without a systematic 
formulation of theoretical principles, and without a 
forthright declaration of his axiomatic values. 
The task of such a theoretical ethics is to work 
out a normative concept of man, a normative judgment of 
what human conduct and social institutions ought to be. 
Mannheim does continually bring a normative perspective 
into his discussion, but he never differentiates this from 
his sociologically descriptive view of man. He continually 
gives evidence of stepping beyond the bounds of sociolog-
ical "inner understanding," and of introducing normative 
ethical principles into the discussion, without acknowledg-
ing that he is doing so. Herein is the basic weakness of 
his whole system, in that he never fully and formally came 
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to terms at the theoretical level with the normative 
aspects of the science of human behavior. Certainly his 
writings are full of discussion concerning normative human 
behavior, and full of normative judgments upon contempo-
rary society and social institutions. The whole of 
Mannheim's writings on social policy and social strategy 
are based upon a normative conception of human behavior, 
and pervaded by a practical ethic which is Mannheim's own. 
What is missing is the theoretical ethics, the systematic 
explication of principles which coherently integrate his 
science of human behavior. 
In this regard, Mannheim failed to recognize that 
only such a theoretical ethics, combined with the insights 
of sociological penetration, could provide a full grasp of 
the anthropological question. When he appropriated unto 
the sociologist the tasks of philosophy and ethics and 
theology, he consequently eliminated the basic distinction 
between a descriptive and a normative understanding of man. 
However, when in his practical pursuit of policy and 
strategy he constantly confronted the problem of direction-
ality, of "where man ought to go," he could not avoid the 
problem of the normative science of man. As a consequence, 
he assumed that the normative was but one aspect of socio-
logical insight, and the real theoretical issues were hidden 
behind his sociological analysis. This is not to say that 
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it is not possible nor desirable for a student of the sci-
ence of man to undertake both aspects of the problem. In-
deed, what is needed more urgently than ever before is the 
interdisciplinary study which combines both the sociolog-
ical and the normative, or ethical, dimensions of the prob-
lem. To risk oversimplification of the problem, the ques-
tions of "what man is" and "what man ought to become" are 
inseparable dimensions of the proper study of man. Never-
theless, the theoretical aspects of each must be clearly 
distinguished, without one being blurred by the other and 
without one task being absorbed by the other. Only a simul-
taneous refinement of sociological observation, and the con-
comitant task of developing an articulate theoretical ethics 
can provide a progressively fuller understanding of man. 
The fulfillment of neither discipline is possible without 
the complementary work of the other. 
Generally, Mannheim's thought concerning ethical 
problems moves at the level of what might be termed 
tertiary presuppositions, to differentiate yet another 
level of presuppositional analysis. Most of his discussion 
of social policy and social strategy operates at this third 
level. For example, in discussing the "ethic of organized 
relationships" for a factory Mannheim states that such re-
lationships would have to answer to the following conditions: 
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sanctions; discipline; code of conduct; assignment of 
responsibility; working incentives and rewards; intel-
lectual appreciation of the purpose of the work; social 
prestige of the job; social hierarchy within the factory; 
etc. 1 These ethical norms represent the level at which 
Mannheim generally approaches any problem of value, i.e., 
at the level of what might be called a concrete ethics. 
He begins immediately at the level of the problem itself, 
and discusses it in terms derivative from, but without 
conscious reference to, a theoretical ethics. In other 
words, he tends continually to by-pass the theoretical 
levels mentioned above, both at the general level of 
axiological presuppositions, as well as at the level of a 
theoretical ethics. 
There is, in short, an embryonic "philosophy of 
social science" evident in Mannheim's thought, but it is 
worked out only incidentally as an essential part of so-
ciological theory, thereby confusing the areas of soci-
ological theory and ethical theory. The confusion was 
due to the fact that Mannheim constantly tended to make 
action both the basis of thought as well as the criterion 
of truth. He found himself in constant tension between 
1Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 162. 
175 
this pragmatic emphasis and traditional idealistic and 
rationalistic epistemological principles. His attempts to 
descend from language to life and to subordinate thought to 
action were constantly counteracted by attempts to regain 
status for rationally coherent principles and above all to 
assert the reliability of the human mind as a competent 
guide for all action. 
In his ceaseless attempts at synthesis, many issues 
and problems were created by the conjoining of only partly 
compatible strands of thought and Mannheim never system-
atically worked out all of these incompatibilities. This 
fact can be partly understood by Mannheim's persistent 
claim to be an "experimental thinker" and not a "sys-
tematizer." He specifically acknowledged in several of his 
books that he had deliberately refrained from eliminating 
repetitions and resolving contradictions. He believed 
that certain themes expressed in different contexts might 
lead to new insights and to clearer understanding, even 
though there be inherent logical contradictions involved. 1 
Again, he expressed the conviction that the time was not 
ripe to aim at absolute consistency when the main task of 
the age was primarily "to break the old habits of thought 
~annheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 52. 
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and to find the new keys to the understanding of the chang-
ing world."1 
Whereas contradictions are a source of discomfiture 
to the systematizer, the experimental thinker often 
perceives in them points of departure from which the 
fundamentally discordant character of our present 
situation becomes for the first time really capable 
of diagnosis and investigation.2 
Even though such statements may temper critical 
judgment concerning the logical structure of Mannheim's 
thought, they certainly do not preclude the necessity of 
bringing critical judgment to bear upon basic theoretical 
problems and basic incompatibilities within the diverse 
elements of his attempted synthesis. Nor does it pre-
clude critical judgment upon his proposed division of 
intellectual labors, where he frequently assigned to so-
ciology nearly all of the really significant questions and 
problems that confront mankind. It is interesting to note 
that while Mannheim generally rejects ppilosophy on be-
half of sociology, he gives also a most eloquent defense 
of the virtues of philosophy in an article on American 
sociology. 3 After first noting some of the harmful effects 
1Mannheim, Man and Societ;x in an Age of Reconstruc-
tion, p. 32. 
~nnheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 53. 
~annheim, Essaxs on Sociologx and Social Psy-
cholog;x, p. 190. 
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of speculative philosophy on German sociology, Mannheim 
then notes that it is the philosophical legacy which is 
responsible for a greater capacity of recognizing con-
nections between things, for the development of a 
comprehensive view of the social process as a whole, 
instead of mere isolated treatment of sporadic facts 
which can be mastered in a division of jobs. Com-
prehensive vision will put every fact in its place 
within the framework of a broad hypothesis embracing 
the whole of society.l 
Mannheim proceeds to point out that Com te was right in 
eliminating the metaphysical stage of thought and moving 
to the empirical. However, this cannot be done, he in-
sists, merely by eliminating everything reminiscent of 
philosophy, but only by "applying to the facts and fructi-
fying in empirical research that gift of consistent ques-
tioning and comprehensive vision which humanity for the 
first time developed in its philosophy." 2 But Mannheim 
did not stay with this highly praised conception of philoso-
phy. He traded it, as did Comte, for sociology, in the 
hopes that he had rid himself of metaphysics and metaphys-
ical issues. The results of this analysis of Mannheim's 
system show that he was not successful in eliminating the 
metaphysical issues. He only pushed them into the back-
ground and eventually introduced them under another guise. 
1rbid. 2Ibid. 
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CAAP~RVI 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISSERTATION 
The conclusions of the dissertation will be dis-
cussed under three general divisions: (1) an outline of 
the three presuppositional levels which were educed from an 
analysis of Mannheim's writings; (2) answers to the general 
questions posed in the statement of the problem of the dis-
sertation in Chapter I; and (3) general conclusions con-
cerning the relationship between sociological theory and 
value theory. 
1. Three Presuppositional Levels 
An analysis of Mannheim's writings disclosed a 
basic framework of axiological presuppositions, which were 
seen to fall within three general levels and which were 
designated for convenience; primary presuppositions, 
secondary presuppositions, and tertiary presuppositions. 
These three general presuppositional levels were, in turn, 
interpreted in terms of a general metaphysics of value, a 
theoretical ethics, and what might be called a concrete 
ethics. These presuppositional levels are not explicitly 
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formulated by Mannheim, but they are evident and operative 
in his system. 
1. General Metaphysics of Value.--The analysis 
and explication of a series of categories disclosed the 
primary axiological presuppositions of Mannheim's thought, 
and provided a detailed accounting of the implications of 
his writings in terms of these categories. This axio-
logical presuppositional framework, including some polar 
categories of a general nature radiating from a central 
focus upon the priority and freedom of the self and its 
ought claim, is condensed into the following series of 
categories: intrinsic and instrumental; inclusive and 
exlusive; permanence and change; causality and spontaneity; 
egoism and communitarianism; personality; ought claim; 
freedom; primacy of religious experience. These categories, 
although only implicit, form a basically coherent structure 
of metaphysical premises upon which Mannheim's entire thought 
is formulated. They constitute, in fact, an implicit meta-
physics of value. 
2. Theoretical Ethics.--Within the context of the 
search for Mannheim's general axiological assumptions, the 
problem of normative values emerged. Since Mannheim's ex-
tensive discussions of social policy and social strategy 
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are based upon the concept of norms or normative values, 
it was necessary to discover what he meant by a ~, 
inasmuch as no explicit definition was evident in his writ-
ings. Further analysis disclosed a series of six charac-
teristics of ~ normative value: synthetic directionality; 
scope for adaptation; inherent ought claim; provisional 
consensus; comprehensiveness; coherence. This secondary 
presuppositional analysis, eliciting the criteria of a 
~' produced the nucleus of a theoretical ethics as the 
basis for Mannheim's own normative view of human behavior. 
Again, as was the case with the general axiological as-
sumptions, this theoretical ethics is only implied, and 
not explicitly stated by Mannheim. 
3. Concrete Ethics.--It was noted that Mannheim's 
thought concerning value problems or ethical problems 
moves generally at the level of tertiary presuppositions, 
i.e., at the level of immediate and practical considera-
tions of the problems of personal relationships and so-
cially organized relationships, rather than at the level 
of a theoretical ethics or the level of a general theory 
of value. No extensive analysis was felt to be necessary 
at this point, since the theoretical problem of the dis-
sertation does not hinge upon this level of analysis and 
also since the bulk of illustrative material quoted 
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throughout the dissertation lends its indirect support to 
this observation about Mannheim' s major emphasis. Mannheim' s 
intellectual mood was essentially and urgently practical, 
and his basic work in social theory generally reflected 
this approach. Hence, his preoccupation with what is here 
termed a concrete ethics. 
2. General Questions Posed 
Certain questions were formulated in the introductory 
chapter, the answers to which have been elicited from the 
various expository, analytical, and critical sections of the 
dissertation. Answers to these questions will now be formu-
lated, based upon the foregoing study. 
1. What are the basic epistemological claims which 
Mannheim makes on behalf of the sociology of knowledge? 
Basically, his claim is simply that the sociology of knowl-
edge has made some relevant empirical discoveries about the 
nature and origins of human thought which require some re-
vision of traditional idealistic and positivistic epistem-
ologies. The sociological fact of "particularization" and 
Mannheim's own conception of total ideology (i.e., the 
claim that every view is perspectivally biased) requires 
that a new epistemological foundation be sought, a new 
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theoretical basis under which can be subsumed all the modes 
-
of thought which, in the course of history, men have suc-
ceeded in establishing. In short, what he calls for is a 
hypothesis that is comprehensive enough to embrace the 
"personal equation" at every conceivable level of knowl-
edge. As was concluded in the section "Fact and Valueu 
(Chapter V), Mannheim's own epistemological assumptions are 
generally in accord with personalistic principles in many 
respects: insistence upon the unity of the analytic and 
synoptic methods; unity of conscious experience; dynamic 
logic to interpret experience; coherence and comprehensive-
ness and dynamic synthesis as epistemological norms. 
2. What is the relation between these epistemolog-
ical claims and the problems of value theory? Epistemolog-
ical issues and axiological issues were seen by Mannheim to 
be dual aspects of the process of knowing, distinguishable 
in experience but inseparably mixed in the content of ex-
perience itself. To "know'' is to perceive both a "factual'" 
content and a "valuational" content in the object of knowl-
edge. 
3. Do "facts" and "values" have a common ontolog-
ical source, or do they arise from completely different 
sources? Both "facts" and "values" arise out of the basic 
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life process in which the individual evolves a knowledge 
of the world in which he lives; i.e., life in a community 
of persons within the context of which he derives a 
Weltanschauung, a system of values, and a basic inventory 
of "factual" and "valuational" knowledge. There is no 
such thing for Mannheim as a naked fact, stripped of valu-
ational elements, nor is there any such thing as a value 
freed from a concrete factual context. The human quest 
for understanding is itself permeated with value and laden 
with the aspirations, desires, and goal-orientations of 
the individual seeker. This complex of cognitive and 
valuational processes is itself grounded in a cosmic 
dynamic creative process, and it is value which ultimately 
offers a basis of interpretation of the physical world, 
not the reverse. 
4. Are there axiological implications in the so-
ciology of knowledge? If facts and values are both in-
tegral aspects of a singular knowing process, then the 
problem of validity in one area is reciprocally affected 
by Mannheim's conclusions in the other area. Thus, his 
conclusions regarding the existential determination of 
knowledge, specifically his doctrines of "relationism" and 
of "particularization," refer equally to the value problem 
as well as to the problem of knowledge. His call for 
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reconstruction of epistemological and axiological hypotheses 
is legitimately based upon his sociological conclusion that 
"the position of the observer influences the results of 
thought." 
5. Does Mannheim draw the axiological conclusions 
which are implied by his sociology of knowledge? His doc-
trines of "relationism" and "particularization" and "total 
ideology' apply equally well to Mannheim's own thought pro-
cesses and valuational judgment, as he noted on occasion. 
Hence, he rejected any claims to being a "systematizer" and 
defined himself as an "experimental thinker" whose task was 
seen to be, in a Socratic fashion, a midwife to the emerging 
synthesis in contemporary thought. This claim, although 
initially a modest one, eventually led to his usurpation of 
virtually all of the major disciplines dealing with the sci-
ence of human behavior. 
6. What are the axiological presuppositions of his 
social philosophy? These axiological presuppositions are sum-
marized above in section 1 of the conclusions. It should be 
noted also that Mannheim' s attempt to apply a "dynamic logic" 
to the problems of valuational processes steered him in a 
middle road between the problems of axiological absolutism 
and axiological relativism. There is a dynamic relationship 
between the elements of his polar categories, keeping in ten-
sion both the universalistic and the particularistic elements 
of experience. 
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7. In short, is value theory possible, and if so, 
under what conditions? Value theory is possible, given the 
assumptions of Mannheim's Wissenssoziologie, and under the 
conditions that any absolute claims to validity and any 
claims to absolute certainty be exchanged for conditional 
or provisional claims of certitude. Only if one were to 
insist upon the alternatives of absolute knowledge versus 
axiological relativism could Mannheim be classed with the 
moral skeptics. There is no moral skepticism to be found 
in Mannheim, as T. E. Hill contends, no matter how inarticu-
late the theoretical foundations of his system may be. 
There is no more skepticism in Mannheim than in the an-
alogous situation of Socrates, who in his own age of ex-
treme skepticism was endeavoring to provide new foundations 
for the intellectual and moral understanding of man. 
Mannheim was right in his basic contention that the soci-
ology of knowledge could be a constructive effort in the 
appreciative understanding of the nature of human percep-
tion, and the necessary limitations of that perception. 
On the other hand, Mannheim was wrong in his tendency to 
assume that the basic epistemological and axiological 
issues could all be subsumed under the aegis of sociology 
and sociological theory. 
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3. General Conclusions 
1. Mannheim's general approach cannot be classed 
as either moral skepticism or epistemological skepticism. 
Those critics of Mannheim who so classify him have simply 
not taken into account the constructive elements that are 
explicit and implicit in his writings. 
2. Similarly, Mannheim' s thought cannot be re-
duced to a thoroughgoing relativism, for to do so would be 
to ignore the universalistic, the inclusive, the normative, 
elements that pervaded his thinking. 
3. Mannheim's elucidation of the social and exis-
tential determinants of thought are not to be understood 
as a denial of the rational validity of moral and intel-
lectual judgments, but are to be seen rather as a refine-
~ in our understanding of human perception and an 
illumination of the qualifying conditions of the meaning 
of the search for truth. 
4. In spite of Mannheim's constant emphasis upon 
the social conditioning of cognitive and valuational 
processes, there is simultaneously a pervasive emphasis 
upon uniqueness, individuality, spontaneity, self-determining 
conscience, and a genuine affirmation of the ultimacy of 
the "person." 
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5. Mannheim fuses and then confuses the roles of 
the descriptive and the normative study of man. The basic 
weakness of his whole system is that he never fully and 
formally came to terms at the theoretical level with the 
normative aspects of the science of human behavior. The 
analysis of the three presuppositional levels revealed the 
extent of his theoretical omissions. Mannheim assumed 
that the normative was but one aspect of sociological 
truth, and consequently the basic theoretical issues 
were hidden behind his sociological analysis. 
6. Mannheim's work, on the positive side, points 
up the necessity of integrating, through interdisciplinary 
study, both the sociological and the normative, or ethical, 
dimensions of the study of man, as complementary disci-
plines. 
7. Mannheim's work points up also, because of 
what he failed to do, the necessity of distinguishing 
clearly the theoretical aspects of each (the normative and 
the sociologically descriptive) and of bringing together 
both the refinements of sociological observation and the 
insights of an articulate theoretical ethics for a pro-
gressively fuller understanding of man. 
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8. Mannheim, in seeking with Comte to eliminate 
the metaphysical issues, did not successfully avoid them 
but only pushed them into the background, confirming the 
notion that sociologists also must at some point become 
self-conscious in regard to the metaphysical and axiolog-
ical assUmptions which they hold and which pervade and 
guide their thought. Mannheim, in spite of all his empha-
sis upon "total ideology" and "perspectivism," was never 
able to articulate fully his own axiological assumptions. 
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ABSTRACT 
ABSTRACT 
The problem of the dissertation was to discover the 
axiological basis upon which Karl Mannheim has developed 
his sociology of knowledge and accordingly his social phi-
losophy. Integral aspects of the problem included the 
question of the link between Mannheim's sociology of knowl-
edge and his axiological assumptions, and the question of 
whether or not he was successful in steering a course be-
tween axiological absolutism, on the one hand, and axio-
logical relativism on the other. 
The method of the dissertation included: 
(a) Exposition.--Chapters II and III were primarily 
expository, setting forth the main outlines of Mannheim's 
sociology of knowledge and the epistemological conclusions 
he has drawn. 
(b) Analysis.--chapter IV was primarily analytic, 
and attempted to elicit the value components of Mannheim's 
system through a series of categorial analyses. These 
categories were educed from Mannheim's writings and are 
basically reflections of perenially recurring problems in 
the field of value theory. The categories of analysis were 
as follows: 
1. Value--Intrinsic and Instrumental 
2. Value--Inclusive and Exclusive 
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3. Value--Permanence and Change 
4. Value--Causality and Spontaneity 
5. Value--Egoism and Communitarianism 
6. Value and Personality 
7. Value and the Ought 
8. Value and the Meaning of Freedom 
9. Value and Religion 
(c) Comparison and Synthesis.--Chapter V was pri-
marily critical and comparative. The results of the cate-
gorial analysis were subjected to critical and comparative 
study, for the purpose of inquiring into the consistency 
and coherence of Mannheim's value presuppositions and his 
sociological and epistemological conclusions. An "axio-
logical profile" was attempted, offering a critical synthe-
sis of the axiological presuppositions which were educed 
from the analysis of Chapter IV. 
Conclusions of the dissertation include the follow-
ing: 
A. Three Presuppositional Levels. 
An analysis of Mannheim's writings disclosed a basic 
framework of axiological presuppositions, which were seen to 
fall within three general levels and which were designated 
for convenience: primary presuppositions, secondary presup-
positions, and tertiary presuppositions. These three general 
presuppositional levels, implicit in Mannheim's writings, 
200 
were, in turn, interpreted in terms of: 
1. General Metaphysics of value.--Analysis dis-
closed an axiological presuppositional framework, includ-
ing some polar categories of a general nature radiating from 
a central focus upon the priority and freedom of the self 
and its ought claim, which was condensed into the following 
series of categories: intrinsic and instrumental; inclu-
sive and exclusive; permanence and change; causality and 
spontaneity; egoism and communitarianism; personality; 
ought claim; freedom; primacy of religious experience. 
2. Theoretical Ethics.--In the search for an under-
standing of what Mannheim meant by norms or normative values, 
further analysis disclosed a series of ~ characteristics 
of a normative value: synthetic directionality; scope for 
adaptation; inherent ought claim; provisional consensus; 
comprehensiveness; coherence. This secondary presuppositional 
analysis, eliciting the criteria of a ~' produced the 
nucleus of a theoretical ethics as the basis for Mannheim's 
own normative view of human behavior. 
3. Concrete Ethics.--It was noted that Mannheim's 
thought concerning value problems or ethical issues moved 
generally at the level of tertiary presuppositions, i.e., at 
the level of immediate and practical considerations, rather 
than at the level of a theoretical ethics or the level of a 
general theory of value. Hence, his preoccupation with what 
201 
was termed a concrete ethics. 
B. General Conclusions 
1. Taking into account the constructive elements 
that are implicit and explicit in his writings, Mannheim's 
general approach cannot be classed as either moral skepti-
cism or epistemological skepticism. 
2. Similarly, Mannheim' s thought cannot be reduced 
to a thoroughgoing relativism, for to do so would be to ig-
nore the universalistic, the inclusive, the normative, ele-
ments that pervaded his thinking. 
3. Mannheim's Wissenssoziologie is not to be under-
stood as a denial of the rational validity of moral and 
intellectual judgments, but is to be seen rather as a re-
finement in our understanding of human perception and of 
the gualifying conditions of that perception. 
4. With Mannheim's constant emphasis upon the so-
cial conditioning of cognitive and valuational processes, 
there is simultaneously a pervasive emphasis upon unique-
ness, individuality, spontaneity, self-determining con-
science, and ultimacy of the person. 
5. Assuming that the normative was but one aspect 
of sociological truth, Mannheim never fully and formally 
came to terms !£ ~ theoretical level with the normative 
aspects of the science of human behavior. 
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6. Mannheim's work points up the necessity of 
integrating, through interdisciplinary study, both the 
sociological and the normative, or ethical, dimensions of 
the study of man. 
7. Mannheim's work points up also the necessity 
of distinguishing clearly the theoretical aspects of each 
(the normative and the sociologically descriptive), and 
not merely absorbing one discipline into the other. 
8. Mannheim, in seeking with Comte to eliminate 
the metaphysical issues, did not successfully avoid them 
but only pushed them into the background, confirming the 
notion that sociologists also must at some point become 
self-conscious in regard to the metaphysical and axiological 
assumptions which they hold and which pervade and guide 
their thought. Mannheim, in spite of all his emphasis upon 
"total ideology" and "perspectivism," was never able to 
articulate fully his own axiological assumptions. 
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